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Executive Summary
Wrongly assuming that crime rates and demography are inextricably linked, a number of  academics warned 
of  an impending juvenile crime wave. In 1995, John Dilulio attached the term “superpredator” to the then 
preadolescents that he predicted would be part of  a huge and ruthless juvenile crime wave (dominated by 
youth of  color).1 These youth were described as “fatherless, jobless, and Godless” by Dilulio, who was 
joined in his dire predictions by James Q. Wilson, Charles Murray, and James Fox. But soon after the peak 
in the mid 1990s, juvenile crime rates fell for the next ten years2 and several studies showed that Dilulio and 
others had gotten the issue wrong. The temporary spike in youth violence was not simply a matter of  more 
youths on the streets, and did not indicate a change in the nature or basic behavior of  youth. Rather, the 
short term rise in crime was attributable to economic disparity, adult drug dealers using youths as pawns, 
and, most importantly, easy access to guns.3
Nevertheless, Dilulio and other “Chicken Little” warnings about “a new horde from hell that kills, maims, 
and terrorizes”4 had taken hold. A barrage of  “get tough on (youth) crime” laws were enacted and for the 
most part remain in effect today, long after the very temporary juvenile crime wave subsided. A combination 
of  media coverage, political fear mongering, and a misinformed public—and conservative mountebanks 
such as Wilson, Murray, and Dilulio—came together to change the very nature of  the national debate on 
juvenile justice. 
Unlike the adult criminal justice system, the juvenile justice system is designed to treat young people as 
youth; not as fully developed and self-responsible adults, but as still growing and reachable children. How-
ever, the late 1990s saw the beginning of  a trend in legislation and policy that continues to this day as the 
juvenile system was made to more closely resemble the adult system. Indeed, the distinction has legally 
blurred as states across the country have made it easier to prosecute youth as adults in the adult criminal 
justice system. Meanwhile, research has shown that such harsh tactics do not increase public safety but do 
perpetuate cycles of  crime and chaos in the already troubled personal lives, families, and communities to 
which these youth belong.5
Fast forward to 2008. This combination of  ideology, political rhetoric, and their impacts, has not yet been 
successfully replaced with a less sensationalist media, a better informed public, or, in most jurisdictions, 
1 Dilulio, JJ. (1995). The Coming of  the Super-Predators. The Weekly Standard, v001, i11.
2 OJJDP, 1999.  Challenging the Myths.
3 Blumstein, A., nd. Youth, Guns, and Violent Crime.
4 Dilulio, quoting former judge Dan Coburn, in testimony before Congress, 1996.
5 Holman, B., & Ziedenberg, J. , 2006. The dangers of  detention: The impact of  incarcerating youth in detention and other secure facilities. 
Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute.
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more rational policies. Newspapers still spread fear with articles about “kiddie” car thieves,6 “homegrown 
terrorists,”7 and youth who “just wanted to kill.”8 Viewing with horror the increased pressures to put chil-
dren in adult prisons and jails, Dilulio, who in 1995 said, “No one in academia is a bigger fan of  incarcera-
tion than I am,”9 now sensibly argues for less detention and a more community-based response to crime. 
However, statutes continue to be pushed and passed that pull more youth into a more punitive juvenile 
justice system and into the adult system. Media coverage of  youth and crime still leave the public fearing the 
young people among them and likely to vote for the most punitive responses to delinquency. 
The NCCD Three-City Study       
The Annie E. Casey Foundation funded NCCD to assess the intersection of  media coverage of  youth 
crime, public perception, public policy, and true trends and issues in youth crime in three US cities: Dallas, 
Texas, Washington, DC, and San Mateo, California. In particular, NCCD sought to help policymakers and 
citizens of  these cities form policy based on accurate data and facts instead of  fear and mythology. NCCD’s 
project had four parts: (1) review newspaper coverage in the three cities for the past two decades, (2) review 
crime statistics to assess what trends were truly occurring, (3) interview some of  the key stakeholders (juve-
nile court judges, chiefs of  police and probation, probation staff, police, prosecutors, and public defenders) 
who best understand the juvenile justice system, and (4) conduct in-depth interviews with the youth caught 
in the system. It is the stories of  these youth—told in their own words and supported by statistics and 
stakeholder expert comment—which best illustrate their plight and the successes and failings of  society’s 
response to serious juvenile crime.
Project methods. Each city had ongoing youth crime issues where there was evidence of  innovative leader-
ship, programs, or approaches to address this concern. The cities were different from each other in overall 
level of  crime, population size, racial and ethnic makeup, region of  the country, and the dominant approach 
to solving youth violence. 
NCCD interviewed 32 stakeholders, including representatives of  the police, probation, youth corrections, 
the court, prosecutors, public defenders, and community-based organizations. Thirteen were judges or de-
partment heads. 
NCCD interviewed 24 youth (19 boys and 5 girls). Their ages ranged from 12 to 19 years, with most be-
tween 15 and 17 years. Twelve were Latinos, 10 African American,  and 2 were White. Each youth was in 
custody in residential placement, in most cases after being adjudicated delinquent. Fourteen of  the 24 youth 
were being held for a violent offense, seven of  which involved weapons. The most serious violent offenses 
6 (2004, July 29). Reclaiming the City’s Youth. The Washington Post. 
7 Milloy, C. (2006, July 19). Juvenile Delinquency Gets Old Fast for Victims. The Washington Post. 
8 Ellis, T.M. and Ball, L.S. (2006, August 2). Teen just wanted to kill, police say: Frisco youth admits serial-killer fascination; 
original suspect cleared. The Dallas Morning News.
9 Dilulio, JJ. (1995). The Coming of  the Super-Predators. The Weekly Standard, v001, i11.
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were murder, aggravated assault with bodily injury (including a shooting), and kidnapping at gunpoint. Six 
youth stated they were in gangs and one more spoke of  hanging out with gang members. Many youth not in 
gangs, particularly in Washington, DC, spoke of  their neighborhood friends or “crews” in terms similar to 
the way self-reported gang members spoke of  their fellow gang members.
Summary of Findings    
The lessons not yet learned from the 1990s myth of  the “superpredator” are multifold.
1. Public perception of  violent crime is largely a function of  media coverage of  crime, especially youth 
crime. Many adults have little contact with youth and most never directly experience youth crime. This 
leaves them to base their impressions of  youth and youth crime on external sources such as word of  mouth, 
public offi cials, and, in particular, the media.
2. Media coverage does not refl ect a suffi ciently thorough or, in many cases, accurate understanding of  
youth or youth crime. Most stories about young people depict them as troubled or, more likely, as trouble 
for society; stories about youth typically associate youth with violence, whether as victim or instigator. Far 
too much coverage focuses on infrequent but heinous cases, without any context. 
3. The public needs to be an informed partner in the conversation about short- and long-term responses to 
crime. Polls show that the public does not favor harsh treatment of  most youth, yet they are often asked by 
politicians to support policies based on misleading information. 
4. Professionals in the juvenile justice system recognize that discussions of  crime trends need to have a com-
prehensive, evidence-based perspective that should be founded on accurate and timely data. Assessments of  
youth crime and associated policy cannot be based on oversimplifi ed theories, short-term trends, or selective 
information. 
5. Communities often need to respond to shorter-term crime trends, and changes in police tactics can be an 
effective part of  that response. Public fear can be kept in check when the system is responsive. However, the 
law enforcement response needs to be planned and carried out responsibly, strategically, and not in a panic 
mode. 
6. At its core, the comprehensive and evidence-based approach is based on the real stories of  the system-in-
volved or at-risk youth themselves. Only in their consideration can comprehensive and effective policies and 
practices be put in place to effectively respond to youth crime.
Key elements of  these fi ndings are elaborated on in this summary of  the study. Topics covered include the 
nature of  media coverage of  crime and youth, the interplay of  media coverage with policy decisions and real 
crime statistics, the attitudes of  the public, and the true stories told by these youth. Recommendations stem-
ming from the study are also presented.
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The Public is Open-minded about Rational Responses to Arrested Youth    
It is important to understand that, when asked to step back from the media’s portrayal of  crime issues, the 
public does not support overly harsh treatment of  delinquent youth. The majority of  the public feels that, 
in order to reduce crime, more resources should be directed toward the root economic and social causes of  
crime rather than toward law enforcement, the judicial system, and corrections. This has been public senti-
ment consistently since 1990.
According to the results of  a 2007 Zogby/NCCD poll, the public was clearly concerned about youth crime 
and felt that young people should be held accountable for misconduct. However, they also believed that 
the most effective ways to reduce youth crime were to increase prevention efforts for at-risk youth and, for 
youth already involved in the system, to increase services, including education, occupational training, coun-
seling, and substance abuse treatment. They felt overly punitive penalties like transfers to the adult system 
increase recidivism but, unfortunately, they had limited confi dence in the effectiveness of  the juvenile sys-
tem. 
What Does the Public Hear?     
System stakeholders stress that community understanding and support are key to a successful response to 
youth crime. However, when community members must rely on inadequate sources for their information, 
they cannot make an informed assessment of  the issue—or of  the actual risk of  being a victim. The danger 
of  a misinformed public is the knee-jerk support of  more punitive responses to youth crime and neglect of  
the long-term, comprehensive strategies that most juvenile justice stakeholders think are necessary.
What is the best way to fight crime?
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What is a highly effective way to reduce juvenile crime?
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*1,043 nationally representative adults were asked if  the listed measures are “highly effective,  
somewhat effective, or ineffective” in reducing youth crime. The percentage of  respondents 
indicating “highly effective” is charted. Margin of  error is ±3.1%. Source: NCCD (2006, April). 
Attitudes of  US Voters toward Prisoner Rehabilitation and Reentry Policies, http://www.nccd-crc.org/
nccd/pubs/zogby_feb07.pdf
The NCCD review of  newspaper coverage of  youths and violence10 and associated interviews with system 
stakeholders found that the public receives much of  its information about youth from the media and that 
the information they receive is distorted.
 “There’s a daily diet of  bad news that on some level creeps into one’s world view. Even if  you haven’t been 
a victim, what you perceive makes you feel vulnerable.”
Stakeholders and NCCD’s research typically were in agreement on the nature and impact of  the media: The 
media’s portrayal of  youth and crime impacts public perception and city policy. The media plays a big role 
in infl uencing public perception of  crime. As one stakeholder in Washington said, “The [Washington] Post 
makes policy in this city.”
Even positive stories about youth or the justice system did not give context, just specifi cs to particular cases 
or events: good storytelling, but not good reporting. For instance, stakeholders in Washington pointed out 
positive stories, such as the opening of  Washington’s Court Social Services’ drop-in center, an innovative 
program by Washington’s Department of  Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS). They felt these were cov-
ered without context and were characterized as exceptions to the norm.
10 Articles covered youth and crime in the past two decades, usually from the Dallas Morning News, the San Jose Mercury News, and 
the Washington Post.
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The press often quotes a politician as he declares a rise in youth crime without support of  the facts. The me-
dia are clearly used to spin preferred policies to the public. 
The Interplay of Media Coverage, Policy Decisions, and Real Crime Data 
A few examples from the three cities illustrate ways in which media coverage is linked with policy decisions, 
and how crime trend statistics are used and, often, misused to inform the discussion.
All Crime Characterized as a Youth Issue in Washington, DC. The rate of  juvenile arrests for violent offens-
es in Washington, DC dropped 60% between 1996 and 2002 and then rose for four years before leveling off  
at about 25% lower than the 1996 rate. The increases in city arrests beginning in 2002 were heavily empha-
sized in newspaper coverage as a juvenile crime wave, when in fact the increase in the juvenile proportion of  
total arrests was less than one percentage point in this time period. The fact that arrest rates for adults were 
also rising was not generally reported.  The youth percentage of  total Washington DC arrests was about 6% 
or lower from 1997 to 2006 -- well below the youth proportion of  the total city population, which remained 
around 20% in this period.
Further, for most of  this period, reports to the police of  violent crime were decreased, suggesting that 
changes in law enforcement policies and tactics accounted for at least some of  the changes in arrest rates. 
Despite some short-term increases, the rate of  reported violent crime (for all ages) dropped by 50% be-
tween 1995 and 2007.
Dallas media ignores decrease in crime. Rates of  violent crime reported to Dallas police dropped 30% 
between 1995 and 2007. Dallas County rates of  juvenile arrests for violent crime dropped every year since 
1994, ending 62% below that year’s rate.
However, Dallas newspaper coverage deemphasized falling rates. Instead, articles stressed the potential for 
trends to reverse due to an increasing juvenile population and teenage boys apparently becoming more vio-
lent. Articles emphasized a rise in specifi c crimes and the failure of  the Dallas Police Department to meet its 
goals for crime reduction. And articles continued to focus on sensational cases. 
Stakeholders stressed that cities should expect ebbs and fl ows in crime, and that it is essential to place short-
term changes in a larger context. Stakeholders stressed that part of  the problem was the lack of  readily 
available and understandable data that the media could use to bolster their coverage. 
Sensationalism fans fear of  youth in San Mateo, California. Stakeholders suggested that the media’s 
tendency to use frightening language surrounding all gang and violent activity, and to emphasize new crime 
waves and trends, made some city leaders, particularly school administrators, hesitant to admit their gang 
problems. Admitting these problems might lead to unwanted publicity and, in the case of  schools, reduced 
funding; unfortunately, this meant that parents and others were left in the dark about important issues. Such 
characterizations also made the public more hesitant to support non-punitive responses to youth crime.
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Emphasis on short-term trends leads to short-sighted policy in San Mateo, California. Some stake-
holders worried that even when media publicity led to effective and needed programming, once the media 
moved on to cover another issue, the effective programs lost their funding. For example, when the gang 
situation received a lot of  attention in the mid- to late-nineties in San Mateo (particularly in East Palo Alto), 
the County put a great deal of  resources into gangs: a task force, increased awareness by courts, a probation-
intensive supervision unit, and more prosecutions of  gang members. When attention shifted to other types 
of  crimes during the late 90s, resources shifted and these programs ended. San Mateo stakeholders sug-
gested this led to an increase in gang crime; now that gang crime is receiving more attention again, the gang 
task force has been revived.  
 “Crime emergencies” in Washington, DC.  In Washington, “crime emergencies” can be called by the police 
chief  in response to short-term spikes in certain crimes. In the 2000s, several of  these so-called emergen-
cies noted spikes in robbery and Unauthorized Use of  Vehicle (UUV) offenses. Rates of  juvenile arrests 
for UUVs had a one-year rise 2002-2003 followed by a three-year decline, with another rise in 2006-2007. 
Increases in rates of  youth arrests for robbery/carjacking (reported in combination by the Washington Met-
ropolitan Police Department) were longer term and rose consistently from 2001 to 2006 and then dropped 
slightly.
These declarations of  crime emergencies have signifi cant ramifi cations. They allow, among other things, 
commanders fl exibility to adjust schedules and restrict days off, provide millions of  dollars in police over-
time, impose youth curfews, increase police access to confi dential juvenile records, give judges added discre-
tion to deny bail and detain adults and juveniles that commit certain crimes, and install surveillance cameras 
in residential neighborhoods. 
Stakeholders in Washington suggested that their policy leaders often justifi ed new expenses and procedures 
as “emergency” actions; this not only frightened the community but made it diffi cult to enact long-term pol-
icy with more thoughtful policy debates. Also, stakeholders emphasized that these “emergencies” infl uenced 
long-term changes in policy and legislation. Many policies stay on the books regardless of  subsequent down-
turns in crime. This includes some of  the most punitive policy changes of  the past two decades including 
mandatory minimums, enhanced penalties, and easing restrictions on trying youth as adults. These changes 
have had long-term and detrimental impacts on the youth in the system—they are more likely to get caught 
up in the system and may be denied access to preventative and rehabilitative community programming.
Successful media and community outreach in San Mateo, California. Stakeholders understood that 
it was sometimes easier for the public to understand a tough stance against crime rather than rehabilitation 
programming and alternatives to incarceration. Opportunities to explain to the public the value of  such 
programming, and the negative consequences of  long sentences for youth were lost every time an article 
sensationalized crime without providing context and response options.
In the late 1990s into the 2000s, San Mateo stakeholders realized that the development of  their new Youth 
Services Center presented a perfect opportunity to inform the media and public, especially concerning the 
importance of  rehabilitation. This was during a period of  short-term fl uctuations but overall decreases in 
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youth-related crime. San Mateo newspaper coverage characterized the crime trends in positive terms, with-
out much of  the “doom on the horizon” language used in other cities. The media described efforts to bring 
the rates even lower through rehabilitative youth and family programming, hallmarks of  the new center.
This good coverage of  the new youth center in San Mateo—comparatively well-balanced and insightful 
media coverage in several local newspapers—showed the purpose, goals, background, and pros and cons of  
the new facility. The success of  the new center, and the nature of  the reporting, was at least partly due to 
the concerted efforts of  police and probation to “sell” the center. Stakeholders said they had made special 
efforts to inform the discussion, and that it worked.
The Untold Story: What Youth Told Us    
Factors that impact crime evolve over time, including the availability of  weapons, the popularity of  one drug 
versus another, community resources, economic conditions, public sentiment, and the resources, policies, 
and approaches of  city agencies.
The evidence-based view that stakeholders argue for is one that carefully considers long-term crime trends, 
evolving factors impacting crime, and, perhaps most importantly, the changing—and often not changing—
circumstances of  youth at risk of  system involvement. 
So what does the media leave out? A very complicated story. Every youth interviewed had a different story, 
yet there were clear patterns as well.
Parents and home life. The 24 youth interviewed described their chaotic home lives, too often dominated 
by substance abusing, violent, or absent parents; multiple residence changes; and family members in trouble 
with the law. Most youth lived in poverty. Youth mentioned parents who dealt drugs in order to pay house-
hold bills, and some parents had pleaded with the court to release their child on probation because his or 
her job helped support the family. Sometimes parents moved their families to seek better circumstances for 
their children, but more often, fi nancial or other disruptions forced the move. 
The adults raising these youth fi t easily into common stereotypes. Many youth lived in single-parent homes, 
yet many—one-third of  those interviewed—lived in two-parent homes. Relationships between parents and 
youth were mixed. Many said they loved their parents and felt bad for letting them down. Almost half  de-
scribed their relationships as positive, with their parents loving and supporting them, and making efforts to 
improve the youths’ lives. Youth with an absent parent most often spoke of  missing that parent rather than 
holding ill will toward them; they wished they could have a relationship.
Unfortunately, the youth spoke of  parents who, despite good intentions, could not provide the structure 
or guidance that they needed. Some parents’ employment, often at multiple jobs, left them with little time 
to meet the youths’ needs. Some parents had troubles of  their own, health issues, drug abuse, or system-
involvement. Most youth had at least one family member or relative who was or had been involved in the 
criminal justice system. At least one youth described parents selling drugs on the streets in order to pay 
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household bills. Most of  the juvenile justice professionals that we interviewed agreed with these young 
people’s observations. The stakeholders stressed factors that compromise successful parenting, including 
parental drug use, lack of  awareness of  children’s lives, and lack of  time to discipline and support children 
due to work hours or imprisonment. Still, the stakeholders felt many parents and guardians seemed to be 
struggling to create a positive home life. 
Both youth and stakeholders spoke of  gaps of  understanding between youth and their parents, including 
cultural factors related to recent immigration, generational differences, and technology advancements, as 
youth used electronics and the internet as part of  their social lives, education, and street life. Relatives—of-
ten a brother or cousin not much older than the youth—sometimes fi lled the role of  absent or incapable 
parents, and these relationships often proved unhealthy. The gaps of  understanding between parents and 
youth were so great in some cases that, according to both youth and stakeholders, parents turned to city 
agencies, most often the police or probation, to step in when they could not handle their children. With 
schools also turning to law enforcement for help with diffi cult students, this contributed to what some 
stakeholders described as an overreliance on the juvenile justice system.
Schools. Perhaps like most adolescents, the young people that we interviewed stressed the social rather than 
academic aspects of  school. They described school environments that lacked the necessary structure and 
stability to help them succeed academically. Gang activity and violence were common.
The majority of  the stakeholders were very concerned with a school’s ability to positively intervene in the 
lives of  young people.11 In particular they were concerned with truancy and dropouts, though reentry after 
expulsions or time spent in juvenile facilities was also a major concern. These disruptions served to make 
academic success even less likely. Both youth and stakeholders thought schools too often involved the police 
in problems on campus and in truancy issues. 
The Street. With their parents and schools unable to keep them on track, and with extensive unsupervised 
time on their hands, the neighborhood was an infl uential aspect of  these youths’ lives. Most of  them de-
scribed the diffi cult environments in their communities. Young people in the juvenile justice system stressed 
their personal exposure to gangs, drugs, and violence at a young age. The youth turned to street life for a 
variety of  reasons—money, status, social life; their motivations were complex. They turned to those who 
could provide some of  the bonds and structure they were lacking at home or at school. And they sought a 
modicum of  control over their own lives. Some were urged into risky behavior by relatives, some were pres-
sured simply because of  where they lived or the clothes they wore. Some spoke of  spending little time in the 
neighborhood, and even among those with active street lives, most were not in formal gangs. But the envi-
ronment outside their homes and schools seemed always to play a signifi cant and troubling role in their lives.
The Juvenile Justice System. Some of  the youth reported that time in confi nement allowed them to think 
about their lives and past actions and expressed a desire to change. However, this desire did not necessarily 
translate into concrete plans for a positive future. Most interviewed youth felt—and stakeholders generally
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11 Representatives of  schools were not among the stakeholders interviewed.
agreed—that during their confi nement they were not making positive progress towards creating a better 
life for themselves. They felt removed from their social, family, and economic obligations. Further, they felt 
some of  their experiences, including failure to complete probation, made it diffi cult to turn things around. 
The youth rarely mentioned resources that had been helpful to them.
Although they had concerns, stakeholders generally commended the efforts of  law enforcement and juve-
nile justice agencies to address the needs of  youth. Stakeholders discussed innovative youth programming 
within the police department, probation, and detention and the increased resources available to youth once 
in the system. However, some stakeholders questioned whether the juvenile justice system was the right 
venue for delivering services, given its main function as law enforcement. 
Policy Considerations    
It is usual for crime rates to fl uctuate; however, newspaper reports as a whole emphasize and often exagger-
ate rises in crime, while drops in crimes are minimized. When overall crime rates are static or dropping, the 
media look for change in individual types of  crime. Increases in crime do not warrant the typically exag-
gerated coverage mostly focused on shocking crimes. Further, crime in general is often attributed to youth 
when, in fact, adults commit the vast majority of  all types of  crime. Positive stories about youth, as opposed 
to those that emphasize trouble and violence, are hard to fi nd, leaving the public with a distorted view of  
youth and their role in crime.
Interviewed stakeholders did not necessarily share the same political views on delinquent youth: some 
preferred greater emphasis on law enforcement, accountability, and public safety, while others preferred to 
emphasize programming, community-based efforts, and prevention. However, regardless of  these views, in 
doing their work, stakeholders considered the full range of  factors that infl uence youth behavior. Although 
elected offi cials may feel the need to respond to crime as reported in the media, or may use such coverage 
as leverage for pushing their preferred programs, stakeholders recognize the cyclical nature of  crime and the 
need to focus on long-term strategies rather than short-term changes. Stakeholders felt that policies focused 
on short-term trends or sensational crimes used resources that would be better spent on more longsighted 
methods. In fact, they felt that shortsighted policies may, in fact, make the situation worse.
Ask the youth! 
Perhaps the most interesting fi ndings stem from what NCCD learned in the youth interviews. The stories 
they told were common to other youth involved in the justice system: unsettled households, violent commu-
nities, the inexorable draw of  drugs, gangs, and delinquent behavior, inconsequential early system contacts, 
and gradually deeper movement into the system. 
As a whole, the stories serve as an outline of  the root causes of  crime and a blueprint for early intervention 
and prevention programs. In effect, they evaluate how the adults in their lives and society at large had met 
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their responsibilities to young people (We did not fare very well.). They suggest how to do better, if  not for 
them, then for their young siblings and the next generation. The youth told their stories with insight and, 
notably, without passing the sort of  judgment that others had passed on them throughout their lives. Most 
of  these youth had a clear idea of  why things turned out the way they had for them. Most took personal 
responsibility for their plight. While acknowledging the failures of  the adults responsible for their care, 
few blamed anyone but themselves. Furthermore, the youths’ assessment of  their own situations agreed in 
almost every respect with how the stakeholders—experts in the fi eld—assessed the same thing. The youth 
were, in short, experts on themselves. And they added a personal element that illuminates how society can 
better serve them and others like them to avoid system contact.
Although these youth were among the most serious offenders in the system, they were not the heartless 
monsters described in many news reports. Interviewers found the youth to be funny, engaging, and thought-
ful; they typically treated the interviewers with courtesy and respect. Their motivations for high-risk and 
delinquent behavior were complicated. However, they often involved common adolescent needs for inter-
personal connections and a sense of  belonging and self  and perhaps seeking a little order among the chaos 
in their lives. 
In short, trends in crime do not indicate tougher responses to youth crime—these youth are not superpreda-
tors. System reform is necessary and demands a comprehensive, long-term approach based on the perspec-
tive of  the youth, families, and community.
Recommendations    
The following recommendations stem from youth interviews, stakeholder comments, and the other fi ndings 
of  the NCCD study.
Initiate a campaign for accurate public information. OJJDP and state agencies need to collect and 
make available the information necessary for meaningful discussion and reporting on youth, crime, and 
city responses. These resources must be timely and accessible to interested audiences with a range of  back-
grounds, expertise, and interests, to include not just researchers or academics, but the media, elected of-
fi cials, law enforcement and other city agencies, and the general public. Types of  information that need to 
be available include crime data, the youth and family perspective, risk and protective factors for crime, the 
structure and purpose of  the juvenile justice system, the nature and impact of  effective best practices in 
programming and service-provision for at-risk and system-involved youth, the impact of  incarceration, cur-
rent research in causes and responses to crime, issues related to class, race, ethnicity, and immigration, and 
blueprints for effective city-wide responses to crime.
Support a media training effort. OJJDP and other justice agencies need to establish methods and resourc-
es for informing the media to the true nature of  youth crime, the lives of  youth in troubled communities, 
and how cities respond. This effort should include an internet-based clearinghouse of  information format-
ted for easy access, understanding, and use by the media. It should also include conferences, seminars, and 
trainings designed to give the media a comprehensive understanding of  youth and crime as well as expertise 
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in the use of  available data and informational resources.
Expand funding for public education. Public perception impacts the system at almost every level, from 
funding for new programs to crime-focused legislation and ballot measures, to understanding the benefi ts 
and detriments to system involvement for youth, to improved intergenerational communication and rela-
tions in the community. OJJDP and concerned foundations need to better inform the public and seek 
productive relationships among agencies, community groups, and individuals. This effort may include justice 
system events and programs linking justice representatives with local communities through community-
based forums and services. Cultural sensitivity should be an essential element of  these efforts.
Promote healthy families and effective parenting. Frustrated and bewildered parents need help recogniz-
ing risk factors for delinquency and effectively advocating for their system-involved children. Justice agen-
cies, collaborating as necessary with public health and human service agencies, need to engage and educate 
parents on effective parenting skills.
Broaden training for police and probation offi cers who work with troubled young people. Federal 
funding needs to support appropriate training and institutional support for police and probation offi cers as 
they take on broader roles in communities.
Remember that juvenile justice system-involved youth are ADOLESCENTS. All of  these recommen-
dations must be planned and implemented with consideration of  this core fact. These youth are not super-
predators, they are not lost causes, but rather have made mistakes. But making mistakes is an integral part 
of  growing up. These youth may be in dangerous ruts, but they maintain hope for new directions. And they 
need help.
To better understand and engage system-involved youth, the fi rst step is to understand their development. 
Those convicted of  serious crime are not so unlike average youth. They are observant, they have a sense of  
themselves, they are proud, yet they are often immature. They have complicated lives and motivations. Their 
home lives may be less than ideal, but they are all they know. They need help contemplating the conse-
quences of  their actions beyond punishment and loss of  freedom.  They need help seeing the big picture. 
They need help, for example, understanding the purpose of  the services offered them, and help developing 
reentry plans. They need help seeing past their release date and reunion with their troubled homes and com-
munities.
One youth interviewed seemed content to be in secure placement for the time being. She was a gang mem-
ber; she had an emotional disorder; she reported that she had been abused at home; she said her father had 
been arrested for drug use and sexual assault. She said, simply, “I don’t mind being in Juvi. Better to be here 
and be safe.”  However, our society must be capable of  providing for safe environments for vulnerable 
young people outside of  locked doors, razor wire barriers, and prison-like settings.
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Preface
Wrongly assuming that crime rates and population growth were inextricably linked, in 1995, John J. Dilulio, 
Jr. attached the term “superpredator” to the then preadolescents that he predicted would be part of  a huge 
and ruthless juvenile crime wave (dominated, he stressed, by African American youth).1 By 2000, juvenile 
crime rates had fallen2 and studies showed that the temporary spike in youth violence was attributable to 
economic disparity, adult drug dealers using youth as pawns, and, most importantly, easy access to guns.3 
Nevertheless, Dilulio’s warnings about “a new horde from hell that kills, maims and terrorizes merely to 
become known, or for no reason at all”4 had taken hold. A barrage of  “get tough on (youth) crime” laws 
followed. A combination of  media coverage, political fearmongering, and a misinformed public—and con-
servative academics like Dilulio—came together to change the very nature of  juvenile justice. Designed to 
treat youth as youth—not as fully developed and self-responsible adults but as still growing and reachable 
kids—the juvenile system began to more closely mirror the adult system; indeed, the distinction was legally 
blurred as states across the country made it easier to prosecute youth as adults in the adult criminal justice 
system. 
Fast forward to 2008 and this combination of  processes, and its impact, has not yet been successfully 
replaced with a less sensationalist media, a better informed public, or more rational policies. Newspaper ar-
ticles still spread fear with articles about “kiddie” car thieves,5 “homegrown terrorists,”6 and youth who “just 
wanted to kill.”7 Dilulio himself, who in 1995 said “No one in academia is a bigger fan of  incarceration than 
I am,”8 now sensibly argues for less detention and a more community-based response to crime. However, 
statutes continue to be pushed and passed that pull more youth into a more punitive juvenile justice system 
and into the adult system. Media coverage of  youth and crime still leave the public fearing the young people 
among them and likely to vote for the most punitive responses to delinquency. 
Introduction
Public perception of  violent crime is largely a function of  media coverage of  crime, especially youth crime. 
Many adults have little contact with youth and most never directly experience youth crime. This leaves them 
to base their impressions of  youth and youth crime on external sources such word of  mouth, public offi -
cials, and, in particular, as the media.
Media coverage does not refl ect a suffi ciently thorough or, in many cases, accurate understanding of  youth 
or youth crime. Most stories about young people depict them as troubled or, more likely, as trouble for soci-
ety; stories about youth typically associate youth with violence, whether as victim or instigator.
1 Dilulio, JJ. (1995). The Coming of  the Super-Predators. The Weekly Standard, v001, i11.
2 OJJDP, 1999.  Challenging the Myths.
3 Blumstein, A., nd. Youth, Guns, and Violent Crime.
4 Dilulio, quoting former judge Dan Coburn, in testimony before Congress, 1996.
5  (2004, July 29). Reclaiming the City’s Youth. The Washington Post. 
6 Milloy, C. (2006, July 19). Juvenile Delinquency Gets Old Fast for Victims. The Washington Post. 
7 Ellis, T.M. and Ball, L.S. (2006, August 2). Teen just wanted to kill, police say: Frisco youth admits serial-killer fascination; 
original suspect cleared. The Dallas Morning News.
8 Dilulio, JJ. (1995). The Coming of  the Super-Predators. The Weekly Standard, v001, i11.
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Professionals in the juvenile justice system recognize that discussions of  crime trends need to be based on 
accurate and timely data that is placed in the context of  long-term crime data trends as well as trends of  
other factors that impact youth behavior. 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation asked NCCD to assess the intersection of  media coverage of  youth crime, 
public perception, actual trends in youth crime, and public policy in three US cities. In particular, NCCD 
was asked to help policymakers and citizens of  US cities form policy based on information and reality 
instead of  fear and rhetoric. NCCD’s project had four parts: review newspaper coverage in the three cities 
for the past two decades; review crime statistics to assess what trends were truly occurring; interview some 
of  the key stakeholders (juvenile court judges, chiefs of  police and probation, probation staff, police, pros-
ecutors, and public defenders) who best understand the juvenile justice system and the youth caught in it; 
and, perhaps most importantly, interview youth entrenched in the juvenile justice system in each city. It is 
the stories of  the youth—told in their own words and supported by statistics and stakeholder expert com-
ment—which best illustrate their plight and the successes and failings of  society’s response.
This report has four sections. First, the media review and a discussion, primarily based on stakeholder in-
terviews, of  the interplay of  the media with public policy. Second, a review of  relevant trends in crime and 
youth arrests. Third, the fi ndings from the youth and stakeholder interviews concerning the factors leading 
to their system involvement, including home life, community environment, and school, and their experience 
with the juvenile justice system itself. These interviews are presented with very limited NCCD commen-
tary—the pictures drawn are clear enough on their own. Fourth, a summary of  fi ndings and recommenda-
tions for better approaches to reporting on youth, coping with public perception, and serving at-risk and 
system-involved youth. While all of  NCCD’s fi ndings, both quantitative and qualitative, are included, the 
report uses the stories told by the youth as the guide for presenting the fi ndings. Stakeholder comments and 
relevant data are included to fi ll out the discussion of  all the relevant issues, which were in almost all cases 
raised by the youth themselves.
Project Methods
City selection
The most important goal was to select cities that were different from each other in overall level/type of  
crime, population size, racial/ethnic makeup, region, and approach to solving youth violence. NCCD also 
sought cities with ongoing youth crime issues where there was evidence of  innovative leadership, programs, 
or approaches to address this issue. Consideration was also given to cities with existing relationships to 
NCCD for practical considerations.
Media review
NCCD conducted a search of  newspaper coverage of  youth crime and violence in the three cities from 
1988 through 2008 via Lexis-Nexis. Local newspaper coverage of  local crime issues was the focus of  the 
media review. Key words included: teen(s), juvenile(s), youth(s), violence, violent, crime, criminal(s), gang(s). 
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Both news articles and columns were included. This report includes descriptions of  articles covering the 
themes and styles representative of  the type and quantity found in the scan.
Crime trend data
The primary purpose of  the quantitative crime data presented is to assess whether trends in juvenile crime 
are cyclical and whether spikes in crime are generally short term? 
The bulk of  the crime data (reported crimes and arrests) reported here comes from federal crime data 
sources. The data reported usually covers the latest ten or twenty year periods, usually up to 2007. Violent 
crimes and property crimes are reported, both of  which contribute to the perception of  risk among com-
munity members.
Data overview. There is no way to precisely measure either risk of  victimization or change in criminal 
behavior. Two types of  crime data that can measure actual risk of  crime included crimes reported to police 
and arrests. 
Reported crime. The most important data for this project come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. 
Crimes reported to police do not speak of  juvenile crime in particular; the data cannot be disaggregated by 
age. It is, however, disaggregated by city. These data are meant to give a notion of  how public perception 
and media portrayal of  crime in general compare to actual risk or experience of  crime.9  
Arrests. Arrest data are collected with the most reliability and detail and can point to crime trends. Detailed 
demographics of  arrestees, which cannot reliably be collected for reported crimes or victimization, are also 
helpful in characterizing offense behaviors and trends. However, since arrests are subject to changes in laws 
and law enforcement practices, a rise or fall in arrests does not necessarily equate to a change in actual crimi-
nal behavior or, therefore, to a change in risk to the public. In fact, research has shown that, in many cases, 
rises in the rates of  arrest have no other explanation than a change in policies, as in the case of  drug sweeps 
in certain areas, “zero tolerance” policies toward youth violence on school campuses, or domestic violence 
policies which lower the threshold at which family members will be charged with assault.10 Nevertheless, ar-
rest data are an important factor in tracking crime and, along with reported crime data, are used most often 
by the media, city leaders, and crime experts. Arrest data here are taken from the FBI’s Crime in the United 
States and from the state and city agencies of  the three cities.
Metropolitan Areas. The media cover crime locally and regionally. Stories of  events in the larger arena 
have an impact on public perception of  crime in each locality within it. Also, some factors impacting per-
9  Less than 50% of  violent crime and less than 40% of  property crimes are reported to police. Violent crimes that involve 
weapons or injury are reported at higher rates; for instance, the percentage of  crimes reported were approximately 55% of  
aggravated assaults involving a weapon, 57% of  rapes, and robberies with injury 80% or more. The proportion of  crime 
reported to police fl uctuates by just a percentage point or two each year, with no particular trend up or down. (Sourcebook for 
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook, 2008.)
10 OJJDP (October, 2008). Girls Study Group: Understanding and Responding to Girls’ Delinquency. Accessed at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffi les1/ojjdp/223434.pdf.
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ceived and actual crime rates, such as economic and social issues, can have a regional component to them. 
Therefore, in addition to city and county statistics, regional crime rates are relevant to the current study.
The regional statistics we chose to investigate were from the most recent 10-year period for the immediate 
vicinity of  the study city, or what the FBI refers to as Metropolitan Statistics Areas (MSAs). Data are avail-
able from the FBI from 1995 to the present. 
The Interviews
Stakeholders. Stakeholders interviewed came from a range of  focus areas within juvenile justice, and 
held a range of  posts from direct care staff  to department heads and judges. NCCD asked stakeholders to 
characterize their jobs, the youth violence in their city, changes in youth violence over time, their city’s (and 
program’s) approach to youth violence, media coverage of  the issue, and if  this coverage affected the city’s 
approach. In general, NCCD asked the stakeholders what was working well in the system and what needed 
improvement. Interviews were in-person and lasted approximately 45 minutes. While no stakeholders inter-
viewed requested anonymity, to encourage frankness NCCD assured stakeholders that their names and titles 
would not be included.
In Washington, NCCD interviewed 12 stakeholders, including representatives of  the police, probation, 
youth corrections, the court, attorney general’s offi ce, public defenders, and two community-based organi-
zations that provide support services to the system, including education. Three were judges or department 
heads.
In San Mateo, NCCD interviewed nine stakeholders, including representatives of  the police (including a 
gang taskforce), the court, prosecutor, probation, and a community-based violence prevention organization. 
Four were judges or department heads.
In Dallas, NCCD interviewed 11 stakeholders, including representatives of  a gang taskforce, court, public 
defender, probation, and a community-based organization. Six were judges or department heads.
Although NCCD interviewed several people that work with the schools and with youth who have had dif-
fi culties in school, NCCD did not interview individuals who worked directly in the school system, which 
limits our ability to address some of  the diffi culties schools have in ensuring safety and engaging juvenile 
justice system-involved youth.
Youth. NCCD focused on the highest-level offenders to the degree that interview logistics and city require-
ments allowed it. Youth interviews were unstructured, though they were loosely based on NCCD’s Juvenile 
Assessment and Intervention System.11 Interviewers met with each youth individually for approximately 45 
minutes. Interviewers asked about life growing up, life before being incarcerated, school, family, and plans 
for the future. Interviews were arranged with the help of  city representatives and followed each city’s and 
NCCD’s own requirements for protecting the confi dentiality and anonymity of  each youth.
11  Information available at the NCCD website: http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/n_cj_jabout.html.
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Twenty-four youth (19 males and 5 females) were interviewed. Their ages ranged from 12 to 19 years, with 
most between 15 and 17 years. Twelve were Latinos, 10 African American, 2 White.
Gang-affi liation was based on youth statements; six youth stated they were in gangs and one more did not 
say he was in a gang but spoke of  hanging out with gang members. Whether reporting gang membership 
or not, most of  the youth interviewed, especially the males, spoke of  groups of  neighborhood friends with 
whom they spent a lot of  time, had formed bonds and at least sometimes participated in various types of  
risky behavior, from substance abuse to delinquency. Youth in Washington in particular did not speak of  
gang membership, but spoke of  their neighborhood friends in terms similar to the way self-reported gang 
members spoke of  their fellow gang members.
The cities did not always provide the formal charge or disposition offense; the youth were not always certain 
which offense they were being held for and tended to catalog their arrests, past and present. Based on these 
rough tabulations of  the most severe offense, 14 of  the 24 youth were being held for a violent offense, 
seven of  which involved weapons. The most serious violent offenses were murder, aggravated assault with 
bodily injury (including a shooting), and kidnapping at gunpoint. There were two assaults on police offi cers, 
a robbery, a sexual assault, a car theft, threatening a witness, six drug offenses, and a vandalism charge. One 
youth declined to divulge his charge. 
Four offenses were gang-related, including a male arrested for coercing another youth into stealing a bicycle 
as part of  gang-initiation and a female who was arrested for graffi ti (and drug possession, though she was 
unsure if  the drug charge was formally adjudicated).
Of  the other four females, three were arrested for domestic violence incidents (assaults on a parent or 
guardian, one involving a weapon and one with injury), and the fourth was a runaway.
Reporting. The number of  stakeholders and youth interviewed is not suffi cient to justify generalizing the 
interviewee’s thoughts, attitudes, and experiences to broader populations. It was NCCD’s goal, however, to 
include in the report information that was common among those interviewed. NCCD’s criteria for what in-
formation to include in the interview report was that a signifi cant number of  stakeholders or youth (roughly 
ranging from three to ten or more) expressed similar sentiments or experiences. These shared thoughts and 
experiences may represent the group as a whole (stakeholders or youth) or may represent subgroups (e.g., 
gang members, youth who liked school, judges, probation workers, stakeholders favoring system reform). 
Unless otherwise indicated, the reader can assume information attributed to the youth or stakeholders was 
expressed by a relatively large number of  interviewees. Estimates of  the actual number of  interviewees in 
agreement are given when they are particularly high (e.g., “10,” or “15,” or “a majority,” “most,” or “nearly 
all”) or low (“one,” “two or three,” “a few”). Quotes used are not composite but rather are reported as ver-
batim as possible. They are the words of  individual interviewees expressing thoughts or sentiments shared 
by other interviewees or seen by NCCD as thematic to the views expressed.
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The Media’s Representation of Youth and Youth Violence
This section describes the results of  the NCCD media review in three parts. The local fi ndings are put in the 
national context through several previously published studies involving coverage of  youth and crime in both 
print and television media around the US. Media coverage in the three cities is characterized by type. Lastly, 
the interplay of  media coverage and each city’s responses to crime are explored chronologically over the past 
two decades.
Following the results of  the media review are the fi ndings from NCCD’s interviews with stakeholders re-
garding media coverage and how it impacts their efforts to serve system-involved youth.
National coverage of youth: Inventing “new forms of menace”
Newspaper coverage in the three cities largely mirrored what several formal national media reviews found 
during the past decade. A 1997 study of  local television news found:
• violence dominated coverage,
• details of  particular crimes dominated coverage of  violence,
• over two-thirds of  the stories about violence involved youth (and over half  of  stories about 
youth were about violence), and
• less than one-fi fth of  stories about violence were contextualized.12
A 2001 review of  70 studies of  newspaper and television crime coverage found the number of  stories about 
youth involved in violence to be hugely disproportionate to the number of  youth arrested for violent crimes, 
especially for youth of  color. This study also found that even when crime was decreasing, stories about 
crime were increasing. The authors spoke of  a “misinformation synergy” in media coverage where violent 
crime is overemphasized, youth are overrepresented as offenders, and, in particular, youth of  color are over-
represented as offenders and underrepresented as victims. This produces “a terribly unfair and inaccurate 
12 Dorfman, L, Woodruff, K, Chavez, V, and Wallack, L, 1997.  Youth and violence on local television news in California. 
American Journal of  Public Health, v87, i8, 1311-1316.
Summary. The media review largely confi rmed that the media does not provide a balanced per-
spective on crime or youth issues to the general public. Articles typically focused on youth crime, 
emphasized crime increases and “crime emergencies,” did not make appropriate use of real crime 
data, and highlighted the more sensationalist aspects of stories rather than context. Further, stake-
holders were generally accurate in their perception of the media’s portrayal.
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overall image of  crime in America. Add to that a majority of  readers and viewers who rely on the media to 
tell the story about crime, and the result is a perfect recipe for a misinformed public.”13
A 2004 study14 found that newspaper stories relied far too heavily on police and government sources in 
reporting on crime, rarely seeking comment from outside experts, community groups, or representatives 
of  the juvenile defendant. This was especially true on shorter pieces, which make up the majority of  crime 
stories. This work found little change in how newspapers cover crime since Doris Graber reported similar 
fi ndings in 1980.15 
A study from 2005 found local newscasts about youth focused on violence, treated youth as sources of  
“social disruption and disorder,” and were “overwhelmingly episodic in nature, focusing on particular events 
and discrete occurrences, without providing any thematic context or otherwise linking them to broader 
trends or issues.”16 
Finally, sociological studies described how deeply though sometimes subtly media-created imagery such as 
“superpredator” and “wilding” impacts the thinking of  the public, creating age and racial stereotypes and 
inventing “new forms of  menace”17 and a “spectacle of  wasted youth.”18
There are, of  course, well reported and in-depth articles of  youth issues and crime to be found in the 
nation’s newspapers. They are not the norm, but they do appear. For instance, a 2000 article in the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle described the way the “superpredator” myth took hold: “This increased violence among 
urban teens was cause for concern but did not justify the wholesale demonization of  America’s youth that 
soon followed. … Politicians seized on this [superpredator] rhetoric, infl amed the public’s fear and exploited 
the gap between public perception and the reality of  juvenile crime. Increased press coverage of  juvenile 
violence, making it seem like the norm rather than an aberration, also fanned public hysteria.”19
Where does the public learn about crime?
It is clear that the media is a primary infl uence in public perception of  crime: 76% of  the public say they 
get information on crime from the media, three times the number who say they get it from personal 
experience.20 Polls and focus groups show that adults with no regular personal contact with teenagers 
13 Dorfman, L., and Schiraldi, V. (2001). Off  Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News. Building Blocks for Youth.
14 Simon, J. (2004). Juvenile Crime Stories Use Police Blotter Without Comment from Suspects. Newspaper Research Journal, 
Department of  Journalism, University of  Memphis.
15 Graber, D.A. (1980). Crime News and the Public. New York: Praeger.
16 Amundson, D.R., Lichter, L.S., and Lichter, S.R. (2005). What’s the Matter with Kids Today: Television Coverage of  
Adolescents in America. Center for Media and Public Affairs.
17 Welch, M., Price, E., and Yankey, N. (2002). Moral Panic over Youth Violence: Wilding and the Manufacture of  Menace in the 
Media. Youth & Society, v34, no. 1, 3-30. 
18 Acland, C.R. (1995). Youth, murder, spectacle: the cultural politics of  youth in crisis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
19 Drizin, S., and Harper, S.K. (2000, April 16). Old Enough to Kill, Old Enough to Die. SF Chronicle. 
20 Dorfman, L, and Schiraldi, V, 2001. Off  Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News. Building Blocks for Youth.
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rely the most on the media for their understanding of  youth and youth issues.21 This is especially true for 
adults and youth of  different races or ethnicities.
Three cities media review
Focus on youth crime
As in the published media reviews described above, articles about crime in the three cities tended to fo-
cus on youth. Juveniles and youth crime were often used in the headline and lead paragraphs, even when 
the article had a broader focus. And there was often no corroborating data or other factual information to 
support the emphasis on youth. For example, in 1993 the Washington Post published an article titled “Po-
lice Launch Initiatives to Cut Juvenile Crime” which begins with the sentence “As investigators looked for 
three young men who walked into a District market and left a clerk critically wounded Tuesday night, police 
launched several efforts yesterday to keep juveniles from committing crimes.”22 However, the article actu-
ally was about a range of  new police initiatives designed to address both adult and juvenile crime, including 
increased patrols in high-crime areas, specialized task forces of  local and federal offi cers, stiffer penalties for 
juvenile offenders, plans for a drug court to send drug offenders to treatment rather than jail, and a learning 
center for suspended students.
A 2003 article in Washington headlined “District Auto Thieves Downsize; Ever-Younger Criminals Help 
Push Stolen-Car Rate Up 20%” reported that “the most crucial tool for some car thieves in the nation’s 
capital is a stack of  phone books – so they can see over the steering wheel.”23 Despite the focus of  this 
article on the age of  the car thieves, this article included no data to show that youth are responsible for the 
increase in auto theft, or that the age of  car thieves is decreasing. (Rates of  reported motor vehicle thefts24 
and of  juveniles arrested for Unauthorized Use of  Vehicle25 did rise in 2003, but they both then fell annually 
until 2006. Despite the rise in 2003, rates of  reported car thefts were still lower than their 1995-1996 levels.)
Unsupported basis, specifi c crimes made to be high profi le
Claims about trends in crime and youth behavior are rarely backed up by data or put into context. For exam-
ple, an articled titled “Curfew Plans Targets Violent Teens; Council Member Seeks to Halt Rise in Juvenile 
Crime in District” quotes a council member that claims there has been an increase in the number of  youth 
who are victims and perpetrators of  violence, but no data is presented to confi rm the councilmember’s 
claims.26 In this dangerous circularity, the media depends on a single source, usually city leaders, for their in-
21 Amundson, D.R., Lichter, L.S., and Lichter, S.R. (2005). What’s the Matter with Kids Today: Television Coverage of  
Adolescents in America. Center for Media and Public Affairs.
22 Castaneda, R. (1993, October 28). Police Launch Initiatives to Cut Juvenile Crime. The Washington Post. 
23  Dvorak, P. (2003, July 5). District Auto Thieves Downsize; Ever-Younger Criminals Help Push Stolen-Car Rate Up 20%. The 
Washington Post. 
24  Washington Metropolitan Police Department Citywide Crime Statistics 1993 to 2005.  Accessed at http://mpdc.dc.gov.
25  Data provided by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department 10/16/2008. 
26  Lewis. N. (1995, March 31). Curfew Plans Targets Violent Teens; Council Member Seeks to Halt Rise in Juvenile Crime in 
District. The Washington Post. 
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formation, just as city leaders seem to depend on the media for their sense of  public opinion.27 Similarly, an 
article headlined “Experts, Family Want to Know Why Teen-Age Boys Seem to Be Growing More Violent” 
describes a few cases of  young males that behaved violently; the article does not at all put these incidents in 
the context of  data on broader crime trends, show these boys to be the norm rather than unique cases, or 
seek information from experts or other sources on whether teenage boys truly are becoming more violent.28
Although the difference between minors under 18 years of  age and adults 18 or older has been clearly 
defi ned as an important threshold29, the media review also found the use of  nonstandard age ranges to 
defi ne “youth.” A 2000 article entitled “Williams Vows to Curb Violence by Washington youths” mentioned 
“youth-on-youth homicides,” “serious and violent crimes among young people,” and “youth violence” in the 
fi rst two lines; only later do we learn that the youth here are aged 16-to-24.30  
Noncontextualized sensationalism: He “just wanted to kill”
Articles typically included sensationalist terms while including only superfi cial coverage of  the range of  is-
sues infl uencing youth violence. The articles do not help the public understand delinquent or at-risk youth. 
A rise in certain offenses becomes a “massive explosion in juvenile crime.”31 An article that covered juvenile 
car theft highlighted the age of  those committing the theft through the use of  terms such as “kiddie” car 
thieves.32
In a 2007 Washington Post article, columnist Colbert I. King said, “Behind the guns are young men so desen-
sitized by their upbringing and their surroundings that the welfare of  others counts for nothing and remorse 
is a word without meaning. The use of  a gun to rob, to mete out pain and to exact revenge comes to them 
as easily as the ability to tie a shoelace.”33 In another 2007 article,34 King begins by retelling a horrifi cally 
violent story from 1991, then concludes that “The outer limits of  1991 are now commonplace.”  The author 
admits that violent crime and homicides have decreased in the city, and offers no other reporting to support 
his claim that “Random, senseless acts of  murder—a ruthlessness that cuts down innocent bystanders—is 
no longer out of  the ordinary.” 
This emphasis on anecdote was evident in various articles where the crime was described in detail, whereas 
the larger circumstances leading to youth crime were ignored. For example, a long article about a teenage 
shooter in the Dallas Morning News, emphasized the details of  his crime and of  the police search; the youth 
27  See Graber, D.A. (1980). Crime News and the Public. New York: Praeger; Simon, J. (2004). Juvenile Crime Stories Use Police Blotter 
Without Comment from Suspects, Newspaper Research Journal, Department of  Journalism, University of  Memphis; and stakeholder 
interviews.
28  Abdullah, H. (1998, June 30). Experts, family want to know why teen-age boys seem to be growing more violent. The Dallas 
Morning News.
29  See discussion in this report regarding Supreme Court decisions regarding the death penalty and the Juvenile Justice 
Delinquency Prevention Act.
30  Cottman, M. (2000, June 23). Williams Vows to Curb Violence by D.C. Youths. The Washington Post. 
31  Evans, C. (1993, July 25). Juvenile Justice System Hasn’t Kept Pace. The Dallas Morning News.
32  The Washington Post. (2004, July 29). Reclaiming the City’s Youth. 
33  King, C.I. (2007, July 28). Getting fi ngers off  triggers. The Washington Post. 
34  King, C. (2007, August 4). At the Root of  the Violence. The Washington Post.
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“went looking for someone to shoot Saturday night—anyone would do.”35 The details of  the crime were 
chilling, but there were no similar details about what led this teen to shoot a stranger, only the inclusion of  
the parents’ suggestion that he needed psychological help. 
Sensationalism goes both ways
NCCD found that newspapers did cover positive stories, e.g., about activities and programs to reduce gang 
violence or about youth who had decided to turn their lives around. For instance, the review revealed articles 
about “Beyond Violence” community forums in San Mateo, youth mock trials in Dallas,36 and about a Wash-
ington youth that has overcome the odds to succeed and promote peace, despite growing up in a diffi cult 
neighborhood.37  
However, as the stakeholders also reported, even when covering more positive youth-related news, articles 
often aimed to move the readers emotionally rather than to edify. As with newspaper articles on violence 
and crime, many more column inches are spent on the details of  unusual circumstances rather than a broad 
context. For example, we are told that the mock trial will help children see the consequences of  their ac-
tions. The article does not address, for example, whether children are committing crimes because they do 
not see the consequence of  their actions or why the mock trials would be an effective deterrent for youth. 
The Dallas Morning News covered a story about a reformed gang member whose nephew was killed by the 
gang he had founded.38  The article emphasized the family relationship and the details of  the nephew’s 
shooting, but there was no discussion of  what led the individuals to join a gang, or how individuals can be 
convinced to leave gangs.
Exceptions
In 2006, a new juvenile hall facility, which aimed at rehabilitating youth rather than punishing them, received 
widespread coverage in the San Jose Mercury News, San Francisco Chronicle, and Inside Bay Area;39 these 
articles all described the purpose of  the new center, noting that “the premise is treatment, not punish-
ment, and the message is delivered in the very walls: soothing pastels to calm testy moods, skylights letting 
in swaths of  sunlight and open space for stretching growing muscles.”40 The articles also tended to stress 
that the county resisted the efforts of  other counties to build large juvenile halls, and that those counties 
35  Ellis, T.M. and Ball, L.S. (2006, August 2). Teen just wanted to kill, police say: Frisco youth admits serial-killer fascination; 
original suspect cleared. The Dallas Morning News. 
36  Adams-Wade, N. (2006, June 28). Youths set to hold court at mock trial. The Dallas Morning News. 
37  Milloy, C. (2005, July 10). Away From D.C.’s Crime, a Push For Peace. The Washington Post. 
38  Grabel, M. (2006, July 19). Ex-gang leader related to victim: Dallas: blinded by bullet, he changed his ways, now talks to 
youths. The Dallas Morning News. Mclemore, D. (2006, October 29). For witness to MS-13 crimes, betrayal was a death sentence: 
Teen gang member ‘was trying to change her life’ by testifying. The Dallas Morning News; Dennis, D. (2007, January 27). Family’s 
mercy draws apology from killer: Man who shot Dallas teen at party vows to live a trouble-free life. The Dallas Morning News.
39  Coté, J. (2006, September 15). New juvenile hall focuses on rehab, not punishment. The San Francisco Chronicle. Gordon, 
R. (2006, September 17). Center to focus on healing youth. Inside Bay Area. de Sa, Karen. (2006, July 30). New Juvenile Hall 
Delivers Message: Skylights, Softer Colors Evident. The San Jose Mercury News.
40  de Sa, Karen. (2006, July 30). New Juvenile Hall Delivers Message: Skylights, Softer Colors Evident. The San Jose Mercury News.
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built larger facilities “despite evidence that juvenile crime has been on a downward slide.”41 Coverage of  the 
center was more likely to discuss rehabilitation and to include details as to why this approach is important. 
Still, the articles depended on city and county leaders who all voiced similar sentiments about rehabilitation, 
rather than on objective research. 
Also in San Mateo, the news paid considerable attention when the county charged a 14-year old as an adult 
for the fi rst time (soon after neighboring Santa Clara County had done the same thing). Coverage included 
interviews with experts who stressed the isolated nature of  these incidents. In regard to the 14-year olds 
charged as adults, although a newspaper article asked if  the “cases, taken together, raise new questions” 
about youth violence, experts quoted in the article shut down such speculation by stressing that the County 
was experiencing low levels of  youth crime, that the rate of  homicides by juveniles had declined, and that 
these were isolated incidents.”42
The interplay of media and city responses
It is hard to determine from reading newspaper articles if  city leaders are using perceived crime emergencies 
to urge policies they already favored, or if  they are proposing policies due to the media/public’s demand for 
quick action. It is clear that newspapers highlighted crime increases and often called for a quick response 
from city leaders. In August of  2003, a Washington Post article headlined “The Kids Are Tougher Than DC’s 
Laws” and argued for harsher laws as “the children of  today have largely outgrown our juvenile justice 
system.”43 A 2004 Washington Post article decried the “sharp increase in fatal shootings” and called for “rapid 
action from the city.”44
It is also clear that city leaders used the emphasis on a rise in crime to call for urgent action and that they are 
aware of  and exploit the media’s role as a conduit to the public. Many articles reported that city leaders had 
proposed new legislation and crime-fi ghting measures in response to perceived crime increases. For exam-
ple, Washington Police Chief  Charles H. Ramsey declared a “crime emergency” at three times: in July, 2004, 
due to a rise in auto theft; in December, 2005, due to an increase in crime, especially robberies; and July, 
2006, due to a general increase in crime.45 The last time Ramsey declared an emergency, he wrote a column 
describing his reasons that was published in the newspaper.46 These declarations allow, among other things, 
commanders fl exibility to adjust schedules and restrict days off. In 2006, the Washington council approved 
emergency legislation that would impose a 10 p.m. youth curfew, give police immediate access to some 
confi dential juvenile records, give judges added discretion to deny bail and detain adults and juveniles that 
41  de Sa, Karen. (2006, July 30). New Juvenile Hall Delivers Message: Skylights, Softer Colors Evident. The San Jose Mercury News.
42  Seyfer, J. (2005, August 1). Experts say charges against two 14-year-olds probably not sign of  trend. San Jose Mercury News.
43  Gillice, T. (2003, August 10). The kids are tougher than D.C.’s laws. The Washington Post.  
44  The Washington Post. (2004, July 29). Reclaiming the City’s Youth. 
45  Wilber, D.Q. (2004, July 19). Ramsey to Unveil Crime Emergency Plan; Changes Meant to Help Police Fight Rise in Auto 
Theft by Youths. The Washington Post. Wilber, D.Q. (2005, December 3). D.C. Killings Prompt Emergency Measures. The 
Washington Post. 
46  Ramsey, C.H. (2006, July 16). Why I Declared a Crime Emergency. The Washington Post.
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commit certain crimes, and install surveillance cameras in residential neighborhoods.47 At roughly the same 
time, a 2006 Washington Post article stated that “many [juveniles] have decided to steal what they want from 
others…It doesn’t matter if  the perpetrators are juveniles. Today, they steal your stuff; tomorrow, they might 
take your life…[Juveniles] have become hardened and increasingly violent.”48 The writer then proceeded to 
refer to these juveniles as “homegrown terrorists.”
Interestingly, though the legislation often would not have an immediate impact on violence, city leaders still 
justifi ed their preferred policies by presenting them as an answer to a perceived “emergency” situation. For 
example, in Washington a spokeswoman said the Mayor “hopes council members will be more receptive to 
initiatives they had already rejected, such as an expanse in the use of  surveillance cameras and alerting police 
when serious juvenile offenders are released from custody, due to the ‘crime wave’ the city is in the midst 
of.”49 
Newspaper coverage often helped these leaders make their case; as the Police Chief  lobbied for access to 
youth records, a Washington Post article stated that “Juvenile crime is rising in the District, and Washington 
Police Chief  Charles H. Ramsey spent yesterday afternoon trying to sell a Washington Council committee 
on a controversial plan to help buck the trend.”50 Stakeholders in all three cities felt the media played a big 
role in infl uencing public perceptions of  crime and what to do about it. Washington stakeholders had per-
haps the strongest feelings about this connection between the media and the policies enacted by city leaders, 
as one of  them said that one local newspaper “makes policy” in that city.
Several articles in San Mateo area newspapers gave in-depth descriptions of  the operations, purpose, and 
benefi ts of  the new Youth Services Center. This represented some of  the most thorough journalism con-
cerning youth and crime found in the media review and was apparently the result of  a concerted effort by 
city leaders to educate the public via the media. San Mateo stakeholders confi rmed they made efforts to bet-
ter inform the public of  the realities of  youth crime in a variety of  ways.
Interplay of media and city response to crime
The remainder of  the media review describes chronologically the apparent interplay between crime trends, 
newspaper articles, and the statements and policies of  city leaders since the late 1980s. The media review 
fi ndings are juxtaposed with government crime data to show how actual crime and arrest trends compare to 
the way crime is reported in the media.
47  Stewart, N. and Klein, A. (2006, July 20). Council Approves Earlier Curfew; D.C. Offi cials Also Support Surveillance Cameras 
in Neighborhoods, Access to Records. The Washington Post. 
48  Milloy, C. (2006, July 19). Juvenile Delinquency Gets Old Fast for Victims. The Washington Post. 
49  Montgomery, L. and Stewart, N. (2006, July 18) Mayor Takes Aim at City’s Spike in Crime. The Washington Post.
50  Dvorak, P. (2006, June 13). D.C. Police Chief  Lobbies for Access To Youth Records; Local Coalition Criticizes Bill Introduced 
by Council Chairman. The Washington Post.
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Interplay: 1988 to mid-1990s. During the late 1980s through the mid 1990s, newspapers in the three cities 
emphasized juvenile crime.51 In Dallas, newspapers described the “surge in violent juvenile crime,”52 and 
Washington coverage included headlines such as “Washington Area’s 703 homicides in 1990 set a record; 
police say disrespect for life, especially among youths, is fueling violence.”53 A Washington article reported 
a “deterioration of  remorse” among youth;54 another attributed the rise in homicides to the “disregard for 
human life on the part of  many young men who have weapons and do not hesitate to use them.”55 Though 
articles focused on San Mateo did not emphasize juvenile crime as much as the other cities, they did discuss 
the “upsurge in violent teen crime” and contrasted contemporary “teens suspected of  armed robbery, as-
sault and homicide” to the teens of  the past who were in juvenile hall for being “truants, egg throwers.”56
The concern about a rise in youth crime in this period led to a range of  local and state “get-tough” efforts 
targeted at youth that were also reported in print media. These efforts included lowering of  the execution 
age, expansion of  the range of  crimes that could lead youth to be incarcerated in an adult prison, implemen-
tation of  youth curfews, and increased sentences for juveniles.57 Media coverage in San Mateo was milder, as 
crime rates did not garner as much attention.58 
Interplay: late-1990s. In the late 90s, newspaper coverage in all three cities acknowledged a decrease in ju-
venile crime; however, the emphasis varied. In Dallas, the tone generally remained skeptical, and articles em-
51  Examples in Dallas: (1991, June 16) Dallas Approves Curfew on Youths. The New York Times; Box, T. (1992, May 17). D-FW 
leads state in juvenile violence. Offi cials fear for future, cite growing troubles that youths face. The Dallas Morning News; (1993, 
October 5). Youth Crimes Raise Moral Questions. The Dallas Morning News; Nagorka, J. (1993, March 29). Fear of  Crime Up, 
But Murder Rate in U.S. Same as in ’74. More Youths Involved in Violence. The Dallas Morning News; Barlow, Y. (1995, March 
26). Juvenile Court System Struggles with Rising Youth Crime. The Dallas Morning News. Examples in Washington: Churchville, 
V. (1988, May 28). Youth Crime A Quandary for Police; Arrest of  Boys, 7, Anger D.C. Mothers. The Washington Post; D.C. Judge 
Walton Describes ‘Deterioration of  Remorse’ to House Panel. The Washington Post; Escobar, G. (1991, January 21). Washington 
Area’s 703 homicides in 1990 set a record; police say disrespect for life, especially among youths, is fueling violence. The 
Washington Post; Woodlee, Y. (1994, February 3). Teen Curfew in District is Proposed. The Washington Post; Lewis. N. (1995, March 
31). Curfew Plans Targets Violent Teens; Council Member Seeks to Halt Rise in Juvenile Crime in District. The Washington Post. 
Examples in San Mateo: Zinko, C. (1995, September 21). Teens to tackle youth violence. Students will study its causes, develop 
action plan, join adults to make it work. San Jose Mercury News. Zinko, C. (1995, December 18). Juvenile Hall bursting at seams. 
San Mateo County’s outdated Hillcrest Juvenile Hall, built in the 1940s, is overcrowded and worn. San Jose Mercury News. DATE?
52 Barlow, Y. (1995, March 26). Juvenile Court System Struggles with Rising Youth Crime. The Dallas Morning News. 
53  Escobar, G. (1991, January 21). Washington Area’s 703 homicides in 1990 set a record; police say disrespect for life, especially 
among youths, is fueling violence. The Washington Post
54  Churchville, V. (1989, May 17). Youth Offenders Said Growing More Violent; D.C. Judge Walton Describes ‘Deterioration of  
Remorse’ to House Panel. The Washington Post. 
55  Castaneda, R. (1993, August 12). Year Ranks with D.C.’s Deadliest; Drugs, Guns, Poverty Blamed as Homicides Kept Pace 
With ’91. The Washington Post.
56  Zinko, C. (1995, December 18). Juvenile Hall bursting at seams. San Mateo County’s outdated Hillcrest Juvenile Hall, built in 
the 1940s, is overcrowded and worn. San Jose Mercury News. 
57  Evans, C. (1993, July 25). Juvenile Justice System Hasn’t Kept Pace. The Dallas Morning News; Barlow, Y. (1995, March 26). 
Juvenile Court System Struggles with Rising Youth Crime. The Dallas Morning News.Ragland, J. (1991, December 2). A Fragile 
Coalition Leads Dixon’s Anti-Crime Battle; Effort Could be a Masterstroke – or a Morass. The Washington Post. Castaneda, R. 
(1993, October 28). Police Launch Initiatives to Cut Juvenile Crime. The Washington Post. Woodlee, Y. (1994, February 3). Teen 
Curfew in District is Proposed. The Washington Post. Woodlee, Y. (1994, March 30). D.C. Crime Package Swipes at Gunrunners. 
The Washington Post. Lewis. N. (1995, January 1). Court Cases Reveal Arms Buildup Among D.C. Youths. The Washington Post. 
Lewis. N. (1995, March 31). Curfew Plans Targets Violent Teens; Council Member Seeks to Halt Rise in Juvenile Crime in 
District. The Washington Post. Lewis, N. (1995, July 15). Youth Curfew Takes Effect At Midnight; Children 16 and Under to Be  
Held; Parents to Face Fines, Counseling. The Washington Post. Zinko, C. 
58  San Jose Mercury News. (1995, December 5). San Mateo County offi cial recommends teen curfew. 
February 2009National Council on Crime and Delinquency
15
phasized the expected increase in the juvenile population, which some predicted would lead to an increase 
in crime; headlines such as “U.S. Juvenile Arrest Rates Fell Last Year. But Experts Caution Much Work Lies 
Ahead” 59 and “Despite Drop in Crime, Experts Are Keeping an Eye on Juvenile Offenses”60 exemplify this 
trend. Indeed, a 1998 Dallas Morning News article headline read “Experts, family, want to know why teen-
age boys seem to be growing more violent,” despite the decreased juvenile crime rates.61 In Washington, 
the media scan found few mentions of  a decrease in juvenile crime and violence. One article attributed the 
decline to a decrease in the juvenile population, decreased drug use, and increased police presence.62 In fact, 
during this time, newspaper articles mostly expressed continued concern about juvenile crime and violence. 
Newspaper articles covered various efforts to curb juvenile crime including job training programs, substance 
abuse classes, truancy reduction programs, increased policing, and youth curfews.63
In San Mateo, on the other hand, articles described offi cials’ efforts to take advantage of  decreased violence 
to boost prevention and rehabilitation services; as one article says, “With violent crime dropping and the 
economy surging, San Mateo County offi cials approved a $728 million budget that includes investment in 
prevention and rehabilitation programs aimed at saving youngsters and adults from lives of  crime.”64 In 1999 
the county rejected proposals to build a larger juvenile hall and opted to build a “Youth Services Campus” 
based on the youth campus model, to hopefully “save youngsters from lives of  crime and addiction by at-
tacking underlying family and personal problems that could land them in the system.”65 
Interplay: 2000s. Articles since 2000 have stressed crime increases and system responses. In Dallas, cover-
age did not emphasize overall crime trends, but continued to emphasize particular crimes or youth, such as 
the teen arrested for murder who “just wanted to kill.” 66 In 2001 and 2002, newspapers ran several articles 
focusing on youth in juvenile and adult facilities.67 The Dallas Observer ran a series of  articles assessing Texas’ 
overhaul of  juvenile justice in the 1990s; this overhaul occurred as a result of  concern over the increase in 
59  Rodriguez, B. (1996, August 9). U.S. Juvenile Arrest Rates Fell Last Year. But Experts Caution Much Work Lies Ahead. The 
Dallas Morning News.
60  Kessler, B. (1997, November 8). Despite Drop in Crime, Experts Are Keeping an Eye on Juvenile Offenses. The Dallas Morning 
News. 
61  Abdullah, H. (1998, June 30). Experts, family want to know why teen-age boys seem to be growing more violent. The Dallas 
Morning News. 
62  Mathews, J. (1998, September 3). Lives of  D.C. Children Improve, Study Finds. The Washington Post. Goldstein, A. (1999, 
September 9). D.C. Life Improves for Children; Report on the Young fi nds Less Violence but More AIDS. The Washington Post. 
Pan, P. (1998, January 28). Police Get Partial Credit for Steep Drop in Slayings. The Washington Post. 
63  Nakashima, E. (1996, September 2). Schools Step Up Incentives to Keep Students in Class; Offi cials Call Truancy a Precursor 
to Juvenile Crime, Gang Violence. The Washington Post. Horwitz, S. (1999, April 17). Study Finds Drug Abuse At Heart of  City’s 
Ills; Mayor Promises More Treatment. Fountain, J. (1999, June 29). Washed Away by Violence; Care, Nurturing Can’t Always 
Save Young Lives from Fatal Uprooting. Ho, D. (2000, March 23). Internships Offer Teens More Than Job Skills; Campaign to 
End Violence Creates Hope. The Washington Post. Slevin, P. (1999, June 19). Court Upholds District Curfew; Youths’ Rights Not 
Violated, U.S. Panel Says. The Washington Post. 
64  Gathright, A. (1997, June 27). San Mateo County Funds Crime Prevention Projects. San Jose Mercury News.
65  Gathright, A. (1999, February 28). Replacing Juvenile Hall, San Mateo County Plans ‘Youth Services Campus.’ San Jose Mercury 
News.
66  Ellis, T.M. and Ball, L.S. (2006, August 2). Teen just wanted to kill, police say: Frisco youth admits serial-killer fascination; 
original suspect cleared. The Dallas Morning News.
67  Housewright, E. (2001, January 15). Youths in half-way house look to life beyond crime. The Dallas Morning News. Rozen, 
M. (2001, February 22). More, please: Quick, someone buy the county’s juvenile authorities a copy of  Oliver Twist. The Dallas 
Observer. 
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violent youth.68 In the following years, much of  the attention on crime was focused on the Police Chief, and 
changes to the crime rate as a result of  the new leadership and policies.69
One recent article in Dallas recognized that violent youth crime had decreased. The 2006 article described 
the results of  a study by the Center for Public Policy Priorities, which indicated that Dallas County teenag-
ers were less likely to die a violent death or be arrested for a violent crime than in years past, by looking 
at numbers from 2000 through 2004. 70 This is the only mention NCCD found of  this decline. Headlines 
were more likely to obscure a decrease in youth crime, such as “Dallas to crack down on juvenile crime.”71 
In 2006 and 2007, the discovery of  sexual abuse in Texas youth prisons led to widespread coverage of  their 
treatment of  youth; as a result, some judges started sending fewer youth to these prisons.72 
Coverage in Washington again began to heavily emphasize juvenile crime and violence in 2003; one head-
line read “Upsurge in Gang Violence Worries Police, Residents; Brazen Shootings in Recent Months Echo 
Crack Era.”73 Newspaper articles focused on perceived crime waves and emerging issues. In particular, as a 
result of  a few high-profi le incidents of  juvenile car thefts that resulted in death, newspaper coverage began 
to heavily emphasize juvenile car theft.74 Even an article about the consolidation of  police service areas—a 
topic presumably unrelated to juvenile car theft—discussed juvenile auto theft in its lead paragraphs.75 In 
2004, newspaper articles emphasized the “sharp increase in fatal shootings of  youths in the District;” 76 the 
Police Chief  focused on youth culture, stating that a culture of  casual street violence could be a factor in 
some juvenile homicides and that many of  the youth victims were in the act of  committing crimes when 
they were killed.
68  Rozen, M., Lyons, J. and Brink, B. (2001, September 13). Make ‘em Pay: Spured by a horrifying wave of  teen violence in the 
‘90s, Texas today spends more money than ever to lock up young criminals. Are we getting our money’s worth? The Dallas 
Observer. Rozen, M. (2001, September 27). Unhappy campers: critics of  a private prison fi rm that ran two juvenile boot camps in 
Dallas wonder where the love is at these “tough love academies.” Dallas Observer. 
69  Brown, A.K. (2003, August 27). Dallas police chief  fi red after four years; crime rate, scandal over drug cases roiled city. The 
Associated Press; Trahan, J. (2006, October 24). Dallas unlikely to hit crime goal: Drop surpasses 5% so far, but Kunkle wanted 
10% in ’06. Dallas Morning News; Trahan, J. (2007, January 3). Murders fall, rapes rise in ’06: Dallas crime down overall, but 
Kunkle fails to meet goals. The Dallas Morning News.
70  The Dallas Morning News. (2006, November 17). Study: Violence involves fewer Dallas teenagers. 
71  Eiserer, T. (2007, August 1). Dallas to crack down on juvenile crime. The Dallas Morning News. 
72  Swanson, D.J. (2007, March 2). Sex abuse alleged at 2nd youth jail: Agency denies cover-up after guard accused of  luring girls 
with drugs. The Dallas Morning News; Jones, G. (2007, March 19). Texas juvenile facilities ruled by fear. The Dallas Morning News; 
Emily, J. (2007, April 9). Judges Send Fewer Children to TYC. The Dallas Morning News.
73  Fahrenthold, D. (2003, September 18). Upsurge in Gang Violence Worries Police, Residents; Brazen Shootings In Recent 
Months Echo Crack Era. The Washington Post. 
74  For examples please see: Dvorak, P. (2003, July 5). District Auto Thieves Downsize; Ever-Younger Criminals Help Push 
Stolen-Car Rate Up 20%. The Washington Post. Chan, S. (2003, October 25). Bill Would Toughen Juvenile Law in D.C.; More 
Teens Could Be Charged as Adults. The Washington Post. Williams, C. (2004, February 12). 6th District Wary of  New PSAs; 
Residents Hope New Police Zones Can Reduce Auto Theft. The Washington Post. Wilber, DQ. (2004, July 19). Ramsey to Unveil 
Crime Emergency Plan; Changes Meant to Help Police Fight Rise in Auto Theft by Youths. The Washington Post.. Cauvin, H. 
(2004, July 11). Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Car Thieves Proposed: Two D.C. Council Bills Are Aimed at Repeat Youth, 
Adult Offenders. The Washington Post. 
75  Williams, C. (2004, February 12). 6th District Wary of  New PSAs; Residents Hope New Police Zones Can Reduce Auto 
Theft. The Washington Post. 
76  The Washington Post. (2004, July 29). Reclaiming the City’s Youth. 
February 2009National Council on Crime and Delinquency
17
Newspapers described the calls by elected offi cials for tougher penalties for juveniles, and often the newspa-
pers made their own such calls. In August of  2003, a Washington Post article headlined “The Kids Are Tough-
er Than D.C.’s Laws” argued for harsher laws as “the children of  today have largely outgrown our juvenile 
justice system.”77 Another article, in the same year, suggested that “Public concern over juvenile crime has 
prompted Mayor Anthony A. Williams to propose some of  the most signifi cant revisions of  the District’s 
juvenile code since it was enacted.”78 Newspapers covered the Mayor’s call for increased penalties for juve-
niles, especially juvenile car thieves, and the Police Chief ’s call for emergency resources to tackle juvenile 
auto theft, despite overall crime levels being low.79  
In 2006, coverage again focused on an increase in juvenile crime, this time with a particular focus on juve-
nile robberies.80 The Police Chief  declared a crime emergency which enabled him more access to resources 
to combat this rise in crime, and the Mayor proposed emergency legislation that would allow installation of  
surveillance cameras in residential neighborhoods, provide an extra $8 million for police overtime, and give 
him authority to adjust the city’s youth curfew.81 Notably, public offi cials seemed willing to also claim vic-
tory through the media, as when Washington’s police chief, two months after declaring the crime emergency, 
stated that “the spike in violent crime has been reversed.”82 The same article quoted the Washington repre-
sentative to Congress that her efforts to increase police patrols should signal to tourists that the Mall was 
once again safe to visit.
In 2007, coverage focused on a “rash of  killings.” 83 Again, a youth curfew was proposed. Finally, in 2007 
and 2008, there was also signifi cant coverage of  juvenile justice in Washington, particularly of  Washington’s 
Oak Hill facility which was implementing many changes.84
Between 2000 and 2006, San Mateo newspaper coverage tended to stress the low levels of  juvenile crime, 
though beginning in 2005, San Mateo coverage emphasized an increase in youth crime, particularly in re-
77  Gillice, T. (2003, August 10). The kids are tougher than D.C.’s laws. The Washington Post.  
78  Chan, S. (2003, October 25). Bill Would Toughen Juvenile Law in D.C.; More Teens Could Be Charged as Adults.” Oct. 25, 
2003 Metro Section
79  Wilber, DQ. (2004, July 19). Ramsey to Unveil Crime Emergency Plan; Changes Meant to Help Police Fight Rise in Auto 
Theft by Youths. The Washington Post. . Cauvin, H. (2004, July 11). Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Car Thieves Proposed: Two 
D.C. Council Bills Are Aimed at Repeat Youth, Adult Offenders. The Washington Post. Montgomery, L. (2005, April 7). Williams 
Proposes Anti-Crime Measures; Mayor Revives Charge For Skipping Court Date. The Washington Post. 
80 Milloy, C. (2006, July 12). Violent Robberies Make It Hard to Ignore D.C.’s Vicious Side. The Washington Post. Milloy, C. (2006, 
July 19). Juvenile Delinquency Gets Old Fast for Victims. The Washington Post. 
81  Dvorak, P. (2006, June 13). D.C. Police Chief  Lobbies for Access To Youth Records; Local Coalition Criticizes Bill Introduced 
by Council Chairman. The Washington Post. Montgomery, L. and Stewart, N. (2006, July 18). Williams Targets Spike In Crime; 
Aim Is to Reduce Incidents by Half. The Washington Post. 
82  Washington Post, Washington Chief  Says Violent Crime Spike “Has Been Reversed.” 9/8/06.
83  Harris, H. (2007, April 7). Churches Alter Outreach to Youths; Rash of  Homicides, Other Crime in D.C. Area Prompts 
Changes in Worship Services, Schedules. The Washington Post. Woodlee, Y. (2007, June 21). Earlier Youth Curfew is Proposed; 17-
Year-Olds to Be Included in Summer Effort to Cut Crime. The Washington Post. Klein, A. (2007, November 19). Slaying toll already 
equals last year’s; D.C. homicides had been falling since 2002. The Washington Post. 
84  Pressley, S.A. (2006, April 9). Oak Hill’s Evolution; As the Troubled Juvenile Facility Plans Changes, It’s Still a Grim Rite of  
Passage for Some Youths. The Washington Post; King, C.I. (2007, October 27). A Sad Toll Within Juvenile Justice’s Realm. The 
Washington Post. Saslow, E. (2006, November 23). Moving the Chains at Oak Hill; Detention Center’s Football Team Given a 
chance to Play Outside as a Way  Toward Rehabilitation. The Washington Post. Pierre, R.E. (2007, December 5). Violent Youths In 
D.C. Being Jailed Longer; Agency Chief  Addresses Critics Who Link Deaths, Early Release. The Washington Post. 
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gards to gang violence.85 This new emphasis led to the creation of  a gang unit as part of  the police depart-
ment’s response to youth crime.86
Stakeholders’ view: Media’s portrayal of youth violence and policy implications
If it bleeds, it leads
Stakeholders stressed that violent incidents were easy to write about and garnered much interest; as such, 
they were likely to be covered by the media. Various stakeholders specifi cally repeated the saying “if  it 
bleeds, it leads.” They suggested stories about violence are often full of  drama, play upon the public’s fear, 
and are readily available. In particular, stakeholders felt that the general public had a fear of  youth crime that 
the media was willing to exploit.
As found in the media scan, stakeholders cited examples of  reporters using odd defi nitions of  youth, such 
as 16 to 22 years of  age, which enabled them to write a story focused on “youth crime.” Stakeholders felt 
that the media described the violent incidents in detail, but did not thoroughly explore the family, commu-
nity, and policy factors that led to these incidents. 
Crime surges
Furthermore, stakeholders reported that the media stressed “surges in crime” and “new waves of  crime,” 
which may refer to a few high-profi le incidents or a short-lived increase in a particular crime category. 
Stakeholders suggested that the media ignored the cyclical nature of  crime, and presented a few incidents 
as the beginning of  a new crime wave. Some stakeholders suggested that by the time newspapers reported a 
“surge” in a particular type of  crime, such as robberies, it was likely that the particular spike in crime had al-
ready stopped. Stakeholders stressed that a city should expect ebbs and fl ows in particular offenses and even 
in the overall level of  crime. Greater care was needed to give the public a broader viewpoint. Stakeholders 
suggested that the media place specifi c incidents in the context of  overall levels of  crime and crime trends.
85  Alquist, E. (2005, October 17). Parents must take lead to keep children out of  gangs. San Jose Mercury News. Kinney, A. (2006, 
July 12). Report paints poor picture on local crime. Inside Bay Area. 
86  Oakland Tribune. (2006, April 4). County to Raise Pressure on Gangs. 
Summary. The professional stakeholder interviews revealed an acute awareness of how the media 
covers youth and crime. Stakeholders reported that the media presented a narrow view of youth 
violence. They thought the media focused on the stories that were easy to tell and did not explore 
the context of these stories. 
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Exceptions, with caveats
Nevertheless, stakeholders noted several news stories about activities aimed at providing positive opportu-
nities for youth. These stories included the opening of  Washington’s Court Social Services’ drop-in center; 
innovative programming by Washington’s Department of  Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), such as 
a production of  “Shakespeare in the Park” and trips to aid in the Katrina reconstruction efforts; and the 
opening of  San Mateo’s Youth Services Center. However, stakeholders cautioned that these issues were cov-
ered because they were one-time events (e.g., openings and trips) and that they tended not to focus deeply 
on the particular issues addressed by these activities (e.g., the need for rehabilitation). It was also likely that 
the city had made a concerted effort to “sell” these reforms to the public, thereby providing the media with 
context for their articles.
Interplay of the media, public, and city response
Stakeholders stressed that the media’s reporting of  youth violence impacts public perception and policy. 
Some suggested that the media created “moral panic” around high-profi le incidents, demanding public at-
tention and a public response. One Washington stakeholder stated that the Washington Post “makes policy” 
in that city. Indeed, during NCCD’s site visit to Washington, the majority of  stakeholders discussed, without 
NCCD’s prompting, a series of  Colbert King articles targeting DYRS; it was clear that these articles had 
garnered much attention. 
Some stakeholders felt politicians reacted hastily to stories in the media to seem responsive. Instead of  craft-
ing comprehensive proposals that targeted the root causes of  violence and addressed the long-term needs 
of  the city, policymakers sometimes enact “knee-jerk” policies that enable them to say “we responded.” Poli-
cies cited by stakeholders as responses to short-term crime issues included some of  the most important and 
punitive policy changes of  the past two decades including mandatory minimums, enhanced penalties, and 
easing restrictions on trying youth as adults for certain crimes. 
Stakeholders also worry that the identifi ed issue to be addressed may not need a systematic response. Some 
stakeholders’ perceived that the media creates crime waves out of  short-lived spikes or out of  high-profi le 
incidents; as such, policymakers may be crafting responses to a trend that may not exist by the time the 
policy is enacted. By responding to specifi c crime categories, as opposed to the overall needs of  the youth, 
the city might not be using its resources most productively, particularly if  by the time policy is enacted, this 
particular spike in crime has ceased. Stakeholders worry that instead of  creating policies and funding priori-
ties based on the ongoing needs of  the city, city offi cials think they must respond to crime waves created or 
at least exaggerated by the media. The issues covered by the media may not represent the most serious needs 
in the city.   
Some stakeholders felt proposed policies were not only short-sighted, but detrimental to the rehabilitation 
and overall safety of  their communities. For example, some suggested that youth that were incarcerated due 
to enhanced punishments were not able to take advantage of  community-based rehabilitation services that 
enable them to learn how to live a productive life in the community. Furthermore, stakeholders worry that a 
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great number of  youth will be affected by city policies crafted with a few particular cases in mind. In par-
ticular, all youth may be affected by youth curfews (and have system contact they would not otherwise have 
had), when these policies may have been crafted in response to a few incidents of  youth crime. 
A few stakeholders also worried that even when media publicity led to effective and needed programming, 
once the media moved on to cover another issue, the effective programs lost their funding. For example, 
when the gang situation received a lot of  attention in the mid- to late-nineties in San Mateo (particularly in 
East Palo Alto), the County put a lot of  resources into gangs: task force, courts increased awareness, proba-
tion intensive supervision unit, more gang members were prosecuted.  When attention shifted to other types 
of  crimes during the late 90s, resources shifted and these programs ended. San Mateo stakeholders suggest-
ed this led to an increase in gang crime; now that gang crime is receiving more attention again, the gang task 
force has been revived.  This phenomenon promotes wasteful cycles where certain programs are implement-
ed, then lose their funding, and then once the given issue receives attention again, have to be restarted. As 
such, policymakers that lobby for their preferred policy positions by proclaiming their urgency and ability to 
tackle the new crime emergency will fi nd it harder to argue for such policies when the perceived emergency 
no longer exists, even if  the policies are arguably necessary. Stakeholders in Washington suggested that their 
policy leaders, particularly Mayors and Police Chiefs, often justifi ed new expenses and procedures as “emer-
gency” actions; this not only frightens the community, but can make it diffi cult to enact long-term policy. 
Stakeholders suggested that the media’s tendency to use frightening language surrounding all gang and 
violent activity, and to emphasize new crime waves and trends, made some city leaders, particularly school 
administrators, hesitant to admit their gang problems. Admitting these problems might lead to unwanted 
publicity and, in the case of  schools, reduced funding; unfortunately, this meant that parents and others 
were left in the dark about important issues.
Impact of public misinformation and fear 
In describing noncontextualized crime reporting in 1980, Doris Graber wrote “The public wants to be 
entertained, primarily, and not educated and prodded into social action.” 87 What makes good reading in a 
single article can, however, add up to much less than entertainment. As one stakeholder said, “There’s a daily 
diet of  bad news that on some level creeps into one’s world view. Even if  you haven’t been a victim, what 
you perceive makes you feel vulnerable.”
87  Graber, D.A. (1980). Crime News and the Public. New York: Praeger.
Summary. Stakeholders suggested that the media’s emphasis on youth crime affected the public’s 
perception of crime in their communities, and their willingness to support certain policies. Stake-
holders felt that the media played on the public’s fears of violence in general, and the fear of violent 
youth in particular. Stakeholders thought the public, aided by the media’s reporting of crimes, over-
estimated the frequency of youth violence and accepted the idea that juveniles were responsible 
for a majority of violent crime.
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Several stakeholders in San Mateo reported that their community reacted even when the stories reported 
were not local; as one stakeholder said, “After news of  horrifi c crimes elsewhere, all of  a sudden the police 
are called every time someone sees two kids walking together.”
Stakeholders were concerned that the general tendency to focus on youth violence, and to focus on particu-
larly vicious crimes and not the background and problems of  the youth and opportunities for rehabilitation, 
made the public generally less willing to fund programs aimed at supporting juvenile justice system-involved 
youth. As one stakeholder said, “Inaccurate public perception is a problem when people who fear kids won’t 
vote for taxes to serve kids’ needs. The fear signals the end of  the resource stream. They won’t pay a penny 
in taxes to provide tools worth a pound to the justice system.”  
Stakeholders felt that it was easier for the public to understand increased penalties and a “tough” stance 
against youth than rehabilitation programming and alternatives to incarceration. As one stakeholder said, the 
public feels that youth just “need a kick in the ass.”
Stakeholders admitted that the public is ill informed about alternatives such as electronic monitoring or 
home visits during incarceration. The public tends to react negatively to seeing these youth back in the com-
munity. Stakeholders felt that the media’s coverage did not help to inform the public of  the benefi ts of  al-
ternative sentencing and rehabilitation programming or of  the negative effects of  long sentences for youth. 
The public tended to support harsh responses to youth.
What can be done to improve media coverage and public understanding?
Educate the media
Various stakeholders stressed that the media could be receptive to a more comprehensive view of  youth 
crime and violence; they suggested it was not productive to assume that the media would always spotlight 
the worst cases of  violent crime and demand punitive reforms. These stakeholders suggested teaching those 
in the media about issues such as rehabilitation. If  reporters approach particular stories with an existing 
understanding of  the issues that impact youth violence, it will be easier for them to present a more complex 
view of  youth violence, despite their deadlines. 
Further, a few stakeholders suggested it was important to think of  the potential “story” when talking with 
reporters. For example, San Mateo stakeholders realized that the opening of  the Youth Services Center, 
which stressed youth development, presented a perfect opportunity to inform the media and discuss the 
importance of  rehabilitation. Stakeholders also pointed out that if  they shared interesting or unique stories 
with the media that highlighted positive programming that worked to rehabilitate youth in the juvenile jus-
tice system, the media was willing to cover these stories. 
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Educate the public: “Wow! They’re just kids!”
Stakeholders in the cities did not resign themselves to the descriptions of  youth presented by the media, nor 
to the policy prescriptions demanded by the media. They described their efforts to impact media narratives 
and to directly impact public opinion. A few high-level stakeholders described situations in which they re-
fused to change policies they believed in despite media pressure to do so. Sometimes, they just had to accept 
a negative response by the media to their decisions. For instance, the Washington Department of  Youth 
Rehabilitative Services (DYRS) had been the subject of  considerable negative press. However, DYRS stake-
holders stated that DYRS leaders would not change course just because of  criticism—they had laid out clear 
goals and planned to stick with them. They did try to work closely with vocal opponents and the media to 
change their impressions of  DYRS, and the Mayor supported their efforts. As one Washington stakeholder 
said, “We need to stand up to the media and say we will not lock kids up unless it’s necessary.”  
Many stakeholders also emphasized their efforts to shape public opinion by engaging directly with com-
munity members. They did not always have to rely on the media to get information out to the public. 
Stakeholders described holding community meetings often to listen to the concerns of  the public and to 
explain to the public any new law enforcement initiative they were planning on implementing. The cities had 
programs designed to educate the public regarding gangs, parenting, and other key issues. Further, several 
stakeholders described the impact on community members of  volunteering and working directly with youth 
involved in the juvenile justice system. Various stakeholders in San Mateo described the effect that volun-
teering at the new Youth Services Center, which houses the juvenile court, juvenile hall, and a girls’ camp, 
among other things, had upon the opinion of  the volunteers. One stakeholder described the reaction of  
volunteers in the Youth Services Center as: “Wow! They’re just kids!” 
Stakeholders suggested that the public was willing to learn about these issues and could be open to compre-
hensive approaches to youth violence. These stakeholders believe that once the community members under-
stand the issues faced by these youth, and come into contact with them, they will be supportive of  policies 
that promote rehabilitation and enhanced services. A few stakeholders suggested that when the community 
was aware of  the issues in their city, they were willing to fund necessary programs. 
Better data
Some stakeholders admitted that the limited data available did not make it easy for the media to place inci-
dents in the context of  larger crime in the city. As one stakeholder said, “Part of  the issue with media por-
trayal, though, is that agencies and city as a whole aren’t coordinated enough to get a true picture of  what’s 
going on with juvenile justice; getting data takes a lot of  transparency.” 
Stakeholders stressed that better data could improve media coverage. Stakeholders suggested that if  the 
media had access to reliable data on criminal trends as well as the costs and effectiveness of  different ap-
proaches to youth violence, they would depend less on emotional arguments. A few stakeholders in Dal-
las and Washington, where the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (which promotes data collection 
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and tracking) had been implemented, suggested that this Initiative was already impacting the conversations 
among stakeholders and the media’s ability to gather adequate data. 
Unfortunately, there are often lengthy lag periods between the occurrence of  crime, the collection of  data 
by government agencies, and the public release of  that data in a usable form, including news agencies and 
researchers. New data systems available to law enforcement provide the police with rapid updates on indi-
vidual crimes and evolving crime trends, but this data is not generally available to the public.
For city law enforcement, quick access to useful data is of  course a powerful tool in both responding to 
crime and making ongoing adjustments in resource allocation. In terms of  policymaking, such data needs to 
be put in the context of  longer term trends and other related factors in order to assist in long-term plan-
ning, including issues beyond those specifi cally related to law enforcement, such as prevention and early 
intervention programming.
The Data: Trends In Crime, Arrests, and Public Attitudes
Public perception of crime
National polls indicate that the media’s crime coverage has an impact. According to a Gallup poll reported 
by the US Department of  Justice, 71% of  adults 18 years or older thought there was more crime in the US 
in 2007 than in 2006. This fi gure is somewhat lower than those polled each year in the late 1980s and early 
1990s when over 80% perceived a rise in crime each year. In the early 2000s, less than 50% perceived a rise 
in crime.
Interestingly, the public does not necessarily perceive a rising crime problem locally even when they do per-
ceive a national increase. Fifty-one percent felt annual crime was rising in their area in 2007, around 30% in 
the early 2000s, and around 50% in the early 1990s.
Summary. Before describing specifi c crime trends in the three cities, this section describes fi ndings 
from national polls of public attitudes about various issues related to crime. The media’s impact on 
public perception is perhaps evident in some misconceptions that are reported, such as the gen-
eral belief that crime rates increase each year. On the other hand, attitudes toward rehabilitation 
and solving crime problems show the public has a better understanding of the issues and a less 
severe attitude toward crime than is often assumed.  
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Perception of Crime
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What is perhaps most interesting about these data is that each year a large percentage of  people in the US 
feel there is more crime than the year before, whether or not actual crime rates show that trend. Whether 
in terms of  counts or rates, whether in terms of  personal experience of  crime or of  arrests, crime fi gures 
do not rise every year, as will be shown in the next section. Yet, the public generally feels crime is increasing 
each year.
Crime as a national issue.
According to The Gallup Poll,88 “Americans currently rate crime as a relatively low-priority issue. In 
January 2007, only 36% rated it as an extremely important government priority, compared with 62% 
for the situation in Iraq and 55% for terrorism. Crime has not registered high on Gallup’s most impor-
tant problem list since 2002. During the mid-1990s it was the top concern, and rated at or near the top 
of  the list from 1994-2000. Crime tends to rate much more highly as a national problem in the eyes of  
Americans when the international stage is calm and the economy is in good shape. Otherwise, those 
concerns tend to overshadow crime.” 
Public attitudes toward rehabilitation of delinquent youth
Nationally representative polls performed by various organizations provide information about how the pub-
lic feels about crime and youth. In 2006, 65% of  respondents felt that attacking social problems was the best 
way to reduce crime, whereas 31% felt more law enforcement would be more effective. In 2000, the balance 
was similar. Ten years earlier, in 1990, attacking social problems was still favored, though to a lesser extent.
88  http://www.gallup.com/poll/1603/Crime.aspx
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What's the best way to fight crime?
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In 2006, the groups that most favored addressing root causes were the youngest respondents, 18 to 29 years 
old, and urban respondents (both 71%). Whites favored more law enforcement more often than non-Whites 
(34% vs. 14%). Non-whites favored addressing social issues more often than Whites (77% vs. 61%).
According to the results of  a 2007 Zogby/NCCD poll,89 the public was clearly concerned about youth 
crime, felt that young people should be held accountable for misconduct, and had limited confi dence in 
the effectiveness of  the juvenile system. However, they also believed that the most effective ways to reduce 
youth crime were to increase prevention efforts for at-risk youth and, for youth already involved in the sys-
tem, to increase services, including education, occupational training, counseling and substance abuse treat-
ment. 
89  NCCD (2006, April). Attitudes of  US Voters toward Prisoner Rehabilitation and Reentry Policies, http://www.nccd-crc.org/
nccd/pubs/zogby_feb07.pdf
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What is the best way to reduce juvenile crime?
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   indicating “highly effective” is charted. Margin of  error is ±3.1%.
The Public Pocketbook
In the NCCD poll, participants were willing to spend more taxpayer money on efforts to reduce crime. 
The majority of  participants in the Sourcebook poll also felt the US spent too little on crime reduction, 
although fewer people felt so recently than in 1990, when crime was of  generally higher priority.
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Accuracy of media representation of data
It is NCCD’s impression that the media reports accurate statistics, but it does not consistently place 
the statistics in the context of  long-term trends and it too often uses the statistics to reach erroneous 
conclusions. Further, the media’s decisions regarding what statistics to report and which ones to omit 
further muddles the line between ethical and unethical. “The cumulative choices of  what is included in 
the news—or not included—presents the public with a false picture of  higher frequency and severity of  
crime than is actually the case.”90
One area which may reach the threshold of  inaccurate is describing “youths” as older than 18, some-
times as old as 25. There are some researchers that make the same mistake, and, in fact, the juvenile 
justice system sometimes maintains jurisdiction over wards as old as 25, so perhaps newspapers feel their 
overly broad defi nition of  “youth” is justifi ed. Yet, the standard as defi ned by, for instance, the Supreme 
Court in its ruling concerning the death penalty and the US Congress in its JJCPA legislation, not to 
mention work in other fi elds, establishes 18 as an important milestone toward full culpability for one’s 
actions and, therefore, the threshold age between juvenile and adult status. Further, legislative “tough 
on crime” trends indicate not a raising but a lowering of  this threshold age, to allow younger children to 
be processed as adults. Considering the media’s role in building public support for such legislation, it is 
misleading to provide data for youth well over 18 as an argument for transferring youth to adult court.
Crime Trend Data
This section will provide actual crime trend data to illuminate three alarming aspects of  media crime cover-
age: 1) emphasis of  crime increases and de-emphasis of  drops, 2) overemphasis on youth involvement in 
crime, and 3) emphasis on particular types of  crime, regardless of  overall crime trends. 
Washington
Reported violent crime in Washington. Despite short-term increases in 2000-2001, and two years of  
increases in 2004-2006, the rate of  reported violent crime for all ages dropped by 50% between 1995 and 
2007.91 
90  Dorfman, L, and Schiraldi, V, 2001.
91  FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
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Washington Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population, 1995-2007
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Washington juvenile arrests. The rate of  juvenile arrests for violent offenses in Washington fell 60% 
between 1996 and 2002 and then rose for four years before leveling off  at about 25% lower than the 1996 
rate.92 
The youth percentage of  total arrests was about 8% in 1995, then fell to about 5% in 1997, and after a 
period of  slight decrease it has been slowly rising since 2000. In 2006, juvenile arrests made up 6.1% of  
total arrests. These fi gures are well below the youth proportion of  the total population, which has remained 
around 20% in this period.
Washington “crime emergencies” in the 2000s noted spikes in robbery and Unauthorized Use of  Vehicle 
(UUV) offenses. Rates of  juvenile arrests for UUVs had a one-year rise 2002-2003 followed by a three-year 
decline, with another rise in 2006-2007. Rates of  youth arrests for robbery/carjacking, reported in combina-
tion by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), rose consistently from 2001 to 2006 and then dropped 
slightly.
92  Washington arrest data provided by the Washington DC Metropolitan Police Department, 2008.
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Washington Rates of Juvenile Violent Arrests, 1995 to 2007
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Note: Violent arrests include homicide/manslaughter, aggravated assault, rape/sexual abuse, and robbery/carjacking. 2007 rates 
estimated from MPD data.
Washington Juvenile Arrests as Percentage of Total Arrests, 1995 to 2006
7.6%
8.1%
6.1%
5.8%5.9%5.8%
5.4%5.3%
4.8%
5.1%5.2%5.2%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
ot
al
 A
rr
es
ts
February 2009National Council on Crime and Delinquency
30
Washington Juvenile Arrest Rates for Unauthorized Use of Vehicle and Robbery, 2001 to 2007
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Dallas
Dallas reported violent crime. Despite small short-term increases from 1997 to 1998 and from 1999 to 
2001, Dallas reported that violent crime rates dropped 30% between 1995 and 2007.93
Dallas Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population, 1995-2007
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Dallas county juvenile arrests. Rates of  juvenile arrests for violent crime have dropped every year in Dal-
las County since 1994, ending 62% lower.94 (2006 rates were not listed, but the referral rates fell slightly from 
2005 to 2006.95)
Despite occasional one-year increases, the juvenile percentage of  total arrests in Dallas County fell from 
25% in 1994 to 16% in 2005, ending just 2 percentage points above the proportion of  youth in the total 
population.
93  FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
94  Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics.  Accessed at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/.
95  Data provided to the Annie E. Casey Foundation by Dallas County Juvenile Department, 2007.
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Dallas County Juvenile Arrest Rate for Violent Offenses, 1994 to 2005
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Dallas County Juvenile Arrests as Percentage of Total Arrests, 1994 to 2005
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San Mateo
San Mateo reported violent crime. Despite a substantial two-year increase from 1999 to 2002 and another 
from 2003 to 2004, San Mateo reported violent crime rates ended 22% lower in 2007 compared to 1995. 
Property crime rates fl uctuated, but also ended lower.96
City of San Mateo Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 Population, 1995-2007
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*1996 not available.
San Mateo juvenile arrests. Rates of  felony juvenile arrests have fl uctuated in San Mateo.97 They had a 
one-year increase in 1999, followed by a three-year drop, followed by a three-year rise. Rates in 2006 were 
12% lower than in 1999, the earliest data were available. (The number of  violent juvenile arrests is low in 
San Mateo compared to the other two cities, so all felony arrests were used here. In addition to violent 
crimes, felonies include burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and drug offenses.)
The juvenile percentage of  total arrests in the City of  San Mateo rose from 11% in 1999 to 15% in 2002 
and then consistently dropped, falling to under 11% in 2006. (The county-wide proportion of  juvenile ar-
rests was 24% in 1994 and 14% in 1995.) The percentage of  the population under the age of  18 has re-
96  FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
97  California Offi ce of  the Attorney General, California Criminal Justice Profi les, 1999-2006.  Accessed at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/
publications/profi les/pub.php.
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mained at approximately 20% during that period. The youth proportion of  arrests dropped below the youth 
proportion of  the total population.
City of San Mateo Felony Arrest Rate per 100,000 Population, 1999-2006
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City of San Mateo Juvenile Arrests as Percentage of Total Arrests
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National and regional data
Media coverage is not limited to stories within city or county limits. Public perception of  youth and crime 
is infl uenced also by what happens and what is covered in neighboring communities and nationally.  It is 
interesting, therefore, to look at reported crime for the broader area. This fi nal data section shows trends in 
reported violent crime for the surrounding counties of  each of  the three cities and reported crime and ar-
rests at the national level.
National
Twenty-year trends in reported crime rates nationwide show a consistent decline leading up to 2007.98 De-
spite a three-year increase from 1988 to 1991, violent crime rates have dropped overall during the previous 
2-, 5-, 10-, and 20-year periods. Rates in 2007 were 27% below those in 1988 and, again, 27% below 1996. A 
rise in the violent crime index from 2004 to 2006, sparked by increased rates of  robbery, reversed in 2007. 
Property crime rates have followed a similar pattern, with increases up to 1991, but a drop every other year 
since then, except for a one-year rise from 2000 to 2001. The 2007 property crime rate was a third less than 
the high in 1991.
National Rate of Violent Crime Reported to Police, 1988-2007
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Looking city-by-city across the US, nearly three-quarters of  city residents continue to experience de-
creasing or stable violent crime rates.99 Even when accounting for cities reporting increases, violent 
crime rates are far lower than they were in the early 1990s.
98 FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
99  Butts, JA (2008). Violent Crime in 100 US Cities. Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of  Chicago.
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National arrests. National juvenile arrests for violent offenses fell each year from 1994 to 2004, at which 
point they had a two-year rise that has again turned downward in 2007.100 Rates each year of  the 2000s were 
at least 40% below 1994 rates and are lower than the 1987 rates.
Rates of Juvenile Arrests, 1986-2006
Washington regional. In the Washington MSA,101 the violent crime rate in 2007 was less than two-thirds 
of  what it was in 1995. Besides one-year increases in 2001 and 2004, the rate fell each year. (Property crime 
rates dropped similarly, though with a somewhat larger dip in 2000 that corrected by 2002.)
Washington Metro Area Violent Crime Rate, 1995-2006
100  FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
101 The Washington MSA includes the District of  Columbia, and the following counties: Calvert, Charles, Frederick, 
Montgomery, and Prince Georges in Maryland; Alexandria, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg, Manassas, Manassas Park 
Cities, Arlington, Clarke, Culpepper, Fairfax, Fauquier, King George, Loudoun, Prince William, Spotsylvania, Stafford, and 
Warren in Virginia; and Berkeley and Jefferson in West Virginia. Source: FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  Accessed at http://www.
fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
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Dallas regional. In the Dallas MSA,102 the violent crime rate in 2007 was two-thirds that of  1995. The vio-
lent crime rate was fl at or dropping slowly but consistently throughout this period, with a slight increase in 
2001 that corrected by 2003. (After fi ve years of  decline, the property crime rate rose in 2001 and 2002, only 
to decline again; 2007 levels were three-quarters those of  1995.)
Dallas Metro Area Violent Crime Rate, 1995-2006
San Mateo regional. The 2007 San Mateo MSA103 violent crime rate was just under two-thirds the rate in 
1995. After falling since 1995 to a low of  483 in 2002, it gradually rose to 555 in 2006, then dropped slightly 
in 2007. (The property crime rate followed a similar pattern; in 2006 it was three-fourths the 1995 rate. After 
dropping to lows around 3,300 in the early 2000s, it fl uctuated around 3,600 from 2003 to 2006 and then 
dropped to 3,356 in 2007.)
San Mateo SF Metro Area Violent Crime Rate, 1995-2006
102  The Dallas MSA includes Collin, Dallas, Denton, Eillis, Henderson, Hunt, Kaufman, Rockwall. Source: FBI, Crime in the US, 
2007.  Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
103  San Francisco/San Mateo MSA includes Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo counties. Source: FBI, Crime in the US, 2007.  
Accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/index.html.
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Professional Stakeholders and Youth Interviews
This report now turns to the interviews with committed youth. The fi ndings in the interviews are inter-
spersed with related comments of  juvenile justice professionals, referred to as the stakeholders.
Although not necessarily daily newspaper readers, the youth interviewed were generally aware of  how they 
were perceived by those around them, peers and adults. They were not aware of  crime statistics, other than 
what they observe. They were aware of  their home and community environments, they were aware of  the 
downsides to their behavior, they were, largely, in touch with themselves and their emotions. Their words 
described a mix of  being active participants in their own lives and being caught up in dynamics beyond their 
control. They knew that police and teachers and parents needed to respond to bad behavior and did not 
seem to hold grudges, but they also felt that until someone showed them real alternatives, they would have 
trouble permanently turning their lives around.
Home life
Poverty, drugs, upheaval, loss
Many of  these youth lived in poverty and some spent many years without reliable shelter, moving often and 
sometimes being homeless. Several stakeholders mentioned youth whose parents asked the court to assign 
probation instead of  placement because their child’s (legitimate) jobs helped support the family. One youth 
said an adult in his home (it was unclear who) sold drugs in order to help pay the bills; his sister was eventu-
ally arrested on a drug charge. Several youth mentioned moving multiple times; one estimated ten moves by 
the time she was fi fteen, another fi ve, and another said he had moved three times in the past fi ve years, after 
his father had gone to prison. In all, ten of  the youth mentioned moving at least three times. Some of  the 
young people had also faced the murder or suicide of  family members and siblings.
Summary. The 24 youth interviewed described chaotic home lives with substance-abusing, vio-
lent, or absent parents; multiple residence changes; or family members in trouble with the law. 
Still, many emphasized that their parents did their best to provide for them. The 32 stakeholders 
stressed factors that compromise successful parenting, including parental drug use, lack of aware-
ness of children’s lives, and lack of time to discipline and support children due to work hours or 
imprisonment. Still, the stakeholders felt many parents and guardians seemed to be struggling to 
create a positive home life.
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Many of  these youth lived with both parents at home, but it was also common for them to live with one 
birth parent and usually a stepparent or grandparent. Several had at least one parent that they “don’t really 
know very well” because they had been mostly absent from their lives. Several youth had one or both par-
ents in prison at the time of  the interview; 14 reported that either a parent or sibling had been incarcerated 
at some time. Absent parents were often described as nice or fun, with the caveat that the youth didn’t know 
them very well since they weren’t around often. Youth were typically ambivalent about these absent parents, 
describing both liking them and wishing they were closer and feeling anger towards them. A couple youth 
lived with grandparents or other relatives. Some youth had been in the foster care system. 
The youth told stories of  parents and guardians who abused drugs, fought mental health issues, suffered 
from serious illnesses, and were violent in the home. One youth said her father was in prison (“he was a big 
drug dealer; sold crack and guns”), her mother was in jail, and her guardian/grandmother smoked crack 
cocaine. A youth serving time for a violent offense described his father in straightforward terms—“cheat-
ing, stealing, doing drugs”—and said he loved his mom, but that she often “punches” him. In all, 14 youth 
discussed being disciplined physically, sometimes in fairly violent ways. 
Stakeholders were very concerned about violence in the home and substance abuse among parents. Like the 
youth, stakeholders emphasized parental drug abuse as a key problem. They felt that heavy drug use was 
commonly linked to unhealthy home environments and contributed to the breakup of  families and the in-
volvement of  parents in the prison system. Also, stakeholders noted that many of  the young people current-
ly in the juvenile justice system were born around the time of  the crack epidemic. In addition to the impact 
on family composition and parental quality, stakeholders worried that prenatal drug use had affected the 
children’s physiological development. (One youth said she had been born prematurely and that her mother 
had used drugs during pregnancy.) 
Complicated relationships with parents and family
Most of  these youth described their early childhood as happy, at least until their middle school years. Most 
of  them described having a good, if  complicated, relationship with at least one parent or guardian. One 
youth, a gang member adjudicated for a fi ght with her mother, said she missed home and appreciated her 
mother because “She never gives up on me.”
Youth described a more nuanced home environment than the stark negative picture presented 
by the stakeholders. Taken together, the interviews illuminated how home and family experiences 
helped to lead youth toward delinquency. 
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About half  of  these youth stressed that their parents or guardians supported them, worried about them, and 
worked hard to ensure their safety and success. These youth described how their parents sought out schools 
far away with better reputations, moved to safer neighborhoods, and tried different parental techniques, 
amongst other things. Despite stakeholders’ concerns about the parents and families of  the youth, they, too, 
reported that some parents tried to obtain resources for their children; unfortunately, these resources were 
often unavailable. Also, while parents may be trying to provide for their kids, they often worked long hours 
and were not able to provide proper supervision.
Youth may receive support and positive encouragement from one parent, but have a problematic relation-
ship with the other. 
A diffi cult job. Several of  the young people suggested that their parents and guardians could not control 
them. Youth spoke of  simply leaving the home if  the parent did not give permission for them to do some-
thing; one youth reported leaving the home for months at a time because he did not like his parents’ rules. 
One young woman had repeatedly run away from her home. She believed that her mother’s passiveness, 
particularly around the mother’s boyfriend, had made it diffi cult for her to respect her mother; she said, 
“when I was growing up all I saw was her be pushed over by [her boyfriend]…I was like, well, if  he can do 
it, so can I.”
The majority of  stakeholders were less sympathetic with the parents than the youth were themselves. They 
squarely placed the responsibility of  youth’s negative life choices on their parents and family environment, 
coupled with community factors; “Whatever we see in kids is because they are refl ecting the situation at 
home and their community.” Stakeholders asserted that parents lacked basic parenting skills and did not 
know how to set limits in the home; as one stakeholder put it, “Parents don’t know how to parent.”
Calling the police on your child. Some of  the youth reported that their parents had contacted law en-
forcement due to the youths’ behavior. For example, a parent might call the police because the youth had 
run away from their family home or from a group home, or a parent might contact a probation offi cer 
because the youth was not following the terms of  her probation. 
Some of  the youth felt their parents had betrayed them by contacting law enforcement, while others stressed 
that their parents did not know what else to do. One youth was sent to juvenile hall because her mother 
called her probation offi cer when she broke curfew; her mother did not realize she would be sent to juvenile 
hall and was very upset. However, the youth believed her mother had done what she felt was best to ensure 
her daughter’s safety.
Stakeholders concurred that some parents resorted to contacting the police and probation to deal with par-
enting issues. A stakeholder in a police department had responded to calls by parents and guardians for help 
with parenting tasks such as ensuring that a child attends school. On the other hand, according to stakehold-
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ers, some parents considered the justice system a place for only the most dangerous youth and thus did ev-
erything they could to keep their children from system contact. The stakeholders described how the public 
is misinformed and how misinformation hinders their work to help young people.
Parent/youth/system understanding gap. According to both the youth and stakeholders, there were 
three types of  apparent gaps in understanding on the part of  parents. As mentioned above, parents some-
times called upon police or probation offi cers to help with traditional parenting tasks. On the other hand, 
some parents seemed to misunderstand or mistrust the aims of  the system. Some parents rejected the sys-
tem even when it might provide needed services. Further, parents seemed to misunderstand their children 
and their children’s risky behavior. 
Youth often mentioned that their parents could not relate to them. This was especially true for those whose 
parents had immigrated to this country. The youth stressed diffi culties communicating with their parents, 
due to language and cultural issues. “[My mother] looks at us like [she] doesn’t really know what to talk to us 
about…she doesn’t even know what to say or nothing cause she’s old school from Mexico and we are more 
wild and stuff.” 
Sometimes the gap in understanding was generational or technological. A lack of  understanding about com-
puters, cell phones, and the internet leaves parents unable to detect risk signs or to respond to them.
One stakeholder stressed that children of  immigrant families may have faced a long separation from their 
parents during immigration, or may have been sent to the US on their own to live with a relative. Immigrant 
parents were more often working very long hours. Further, stakeholders stressed that immigrant adults may 
be more suspicious of  the justice system. Some of  these immigrant parents understood the system the least. 
They could not effectively advocate for their system-involved children or make the best use of  its services.
Stakeholders spoke of  parents who failed to notice obvious signs that their kids were involved in risk behav-
ior, from personal issues like self-mutilation (cutting) to drug use to promiscuity to gang activity. Even when 
presented with evidence by authorities, some parents had a “not my child” mentality. One stakeholder said 
“Parents may think teenagers are all bad, but it’s different when it comes to their own kid. My kid is good.” 
Parents would resist residential placement because they did not want their child to be living with “those” 
teenagers. This sometimes prevented the child from receiving appropriate services, although judges can sign 
releases for placement or services when parents refuse. Stakeholders stressed that success in probation and 
programming is even more diffi cult for the youth without the support and agreement of  family.
Infl uences and expectations; intergenerational lifestyles. Several youth mentioned that, since their par-
ents were often working long hours or incarcerated and had very limited resources, they were left to the care 
of  older siblings and relatives.
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Stakeholders were very concerned with how siblings involved in negative behavior infl uenced the youth’s be-
havior. Five of  the youth reported that their older siblings or cousins introduced them to criminal behavior.
Some of  the youth described looking up to their older siblings or cousins, and felt that these older youth 
had greater infl uence on them then their own parents. Unfortunately, these older relatives or siblings, them-
selves unsupervised, often did not engage in positive behavior and undermined parental advice. One youth 
was trying to match his brother’s rough reputation; the brother was serving a long state prison sentence. 
 “When I was growing up I didn’t really have my dad around, he was in prison. So my brother was 
basically like a dad when my dad was locked up. My mom was a single mom, trying to work, take care 
of  us; she wasn’t around that much, she was working.” 
Several youth reported feeling that their families expected them to engage in risky behavior or crime. For 
instance one youth said his family had always expected him and his cousin to get into trouble, even though 
his cousin had ended up going to college.
Stakeholders said that a recent increase in gang behavior among youth was due to some extent to recruit-
ment by their older relatives returning home after 10- or 15-year prison sentences. Youth, especially those 
whose parents had trouble with the law, recognized the intergenerational cycles in which they were caught. 
As reported above, many reported system-involved parents and relatives, and some were recruited into 
criminal life by relatives.
“Ever since I was younger, I always wanted to be like my cousin, a gang member. My mom and my 
dad tried so hard to keep me away from that but, I don’t know, I  was being hella defi ant, I wouldn’t 
listen to my parents so much. They would tell me I couldn’t go out and I would just leave; they had 
no control over me anymore. My cousin, he knew I wasn’t a little kid no more, [he told me] ‘alright if  
you want to get into it, this stuff, I’m not gonna stop you.’ Then I started getting into gang stuff  and 
from there it went all bad.” 
Family as motivation, for better or for worse. Some youth were motivated to improve their lives because 
of  the infl uence of  their families; others had been drawn into risky behavior because of  family; some had 
both seemingly contradictory forces at work, as family knowingly or unknowingly facilitated risk behavior 
and encouraged their children to leave it behind.
About half  of  the youth discussed their plans to help their families after release from custody. They were 
eager to begin to remedy the pain they had caused their families. Some of  the youth only recognized their 
parents’ support after being incarcerated; one youth said, “Nobody’s there for me, not even my homies; my 
mom’s here.” 
“I’m not really scared to die or nothing like that but I know the pain and problems I would put my 
family through would be greater than any other suffering or pain. I hate to see my mom and my dad 
suffer like that…I know they love me a lot, they care for me so much.”
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Several of  the youth stressed that they refl ected on their actions after realizing the pain they were causing 
their families. Often, family was the only motivator for change discussed by these youth. Other motivators 
to turn their lives around included personal development and success, teachers, or their own current or fu-
ture children. In contrast, they rarely said that services provided by the justice system or schools, or individ-
uals within those systems, had struck a chord with them and motivated them to change. 
Some youth expressed the desire to protect their own young siblings or children from the cycle in which 
they had been caught. One of  the two youth interviewed who had children said he hoped to “be a good 
father. I don’t want to be like my dad…I have a daughter…I don’t know what she’s doing, so basically right 
now, the truth is, right now I’m locked up: I did the same thing as my dad, basically I’m the same.”  
Several of  the young people also expressed concern over the example they were setting for their younger 
siblings; a couple of  youth wrote letters to their younger siblings while incarcerated urging them not to fol-
low their path. Still, a few mentioned that their younger siblings seem to be following in their footsteps. 
Diffi cult life events: “I started acting hella bad.”
At times, youth linked their negative behavior with specifi c events or trauma they had experienced. They 
described acting out after the event. A young woman who had been abused by her father said that after the 
incident, “I started, I dunno…I didn’t care about anything anymore. I was doing drugs and hanging out with 
kids in gangs and I went to jail. I was doing a lot of  drugs and I didn’t care about anybody, nothing.” 
And when his cousin and childhood friend was sentenced to 17 years in prison in the same month that 
another close cousin committed suicide, another youth “fl ew off  the handle,” began acting out and starting 
fi ghts while in youth camp, leading to a year being added to his sentence. “I lost the two male models that I 
look up to, I can’t see them no more, I can’t talk to them no more. It still bothers me but I try not to think 
about it…it was like my two closest siblings. Everybody expected me and my cousin to be hella bad, but the 
one that killed himself, he graduated from college, he did hella good in school. After he committed suicide I 
still had two to three months at camp and I started acting hella bad, I started messing up. I had a home pass 
and I caught a new charge: I tried to hit somebody with a shovel.”
Neighborhood
Summary. With unsettled home lives and extensive unsupervised time on their hands, the neigh-
borhood was an infl uential aspect of these youth’s lives. Most of them described the diffi cult 
environments in their communities. Stakeholders reported that the neighborhoods and communi-
ties in which youth reside aggravate the situation at home. Both youth and stakeholder interviews 
stressed youths’ early exposure to gangs, drugs, and violence at a young age. Youth tended to 
link their criminal behavior to gangs or their desire to earn income, but their motivations were more 
complex and their alternatives limited.
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Dangerous neighborhoods—“One-fi fty for a .380.”
Youth tended to characterize their communities as poor, chaotic, and violent. Youth described fi ghts in their 
parks and drug dealers in their streets. A stakeholder said that given the violence in some communities, she 
believed youths when they claimed to need to carry a gun for protection. Indeed, two youths said they car-
ried weapons for protection due to the violence in their neighborhood. A youth said guns were easy to fi nd 
on the street, and cheap: “One-fi fty for a .380.”
Most of  these youth, including some of  the most serious offenders, were not involved with gangs. Even 
those who were not suggested that gangs and crews played a large role in their communities. They felt that 
such groups could not be simply ignored; they affected safety and social and economic opportunities, and 
seemed to have a hold of  certain neighborhoods.
Youth rarely mentioned positive activities or contacts with adults in their neighborhoods. Stakeholders 
stressed that the neighborhoods lacked jobs, positive role models, and pro-social opportunities for youth 
and families, such as mentoring, mental health services, substance abuse treatment, family counseling, and 
parental training.
Pathways to risk behavior, gangs and the drug trade: “I joined ‘cause I was down, I grew up to do 
this.”
Early exposure and gang culture. Youth were often exposed to—and made positive associations with—
gangs, the drug trade, and violence at a young age. Fifteen of  the 24 youth interviewed admitted to heavy al-
cohol and/or drug use; several drank alcohol and used drugs before age ten. A few joined gangs in fi fth and 
sixth grade. One youth described running errands for the “old heads,” local drug dealers, as a seven year-old. 
He was impressed by them because they had “clothes, kicks, gold chains, cars” in contrast to the poverty 
faced by his family and much of  his neighborhood. Another youth reported older gang members provided 
him with clothing as a token of  appreciation. 
Several youth suggested that they fi rst began to engage in criminal behavior for fi nancial reasons and for the 
status attached to it. These youth described being bullied and ridiculed for their poverty. They emphasized 
their eagerness to earn money, even illegally. One youth described the joy he felt the fi rst time he sold drugs; 
he was able to buy clothes, presents for his mother and sister, and purchase more drugs to sell. He found 
the drugs in the hallway of  his apartment building; since he spent time with the local drug dealers, he knew 
where and how to sell the drugs. “I love making money,” he said and told tales of  renting hotel rooms and 
throwing parties. He was concerned as to what would happen upon his release, as he thought it would be 
diffi cult for him to restrain from selling drugs. Having money and wearing more expensive clothing, these 
young people felt they could exert more control over their image and life. No other options offered similar 
fi nancial gains.
Public image, street cred. The youth did not seem aware specifi cally of  how the media covered their lives, 
but they certainly had a sense, from peers, parents, other adults, authorities, and society at large, that they 
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were being judged for their socioeconomic status, race, behavior, or reputation—for being “bad” or for 
not being bad enough, depending on who was looking. For instance, many suggested they were ridiculed 
and bullied if  they did not wear the right clothes. They looked up to those in the neighborhood that overtly 
displayed their wealth even though they knew income was illegal.
It is not unusual, of  course, for youth to feel the pressures of  self-image and status among their peers. 
These youth, however, described coping with those normal pressures with those of  their home lives and 
neighborhood environments.
“When I was a kid, I was lower class, the type that didn’t have stuff. As soon as I started growing 
up, I started having my own money, you know, hanging out on the streets. I started to have my own 
clothes, I got nice stuff, I always wanted that stuff.”
Some stressed the community recognition they received. One of  the young men interviewed had a brother 
serving a long-term prison sentence. Despite the possibility of  facing a similar fate as his brother, the young 
man joined his brother’s gang and engaged in some violent behavior. He said that despite his brother’s long 
prison sentence, the fame he had achieved in the neighborhood seemed very appealing. He said, “I think I 
was so hyped up about everybody in my neighborhood that knew my brother’s name, everybody knew him 
right? And I wanted them to know my name. I was like ‘hey I want my name to be just as big as his’ and I 
was doing what I could do to pump my name up as big as his was.”
Infl uences and expectations. Many emphasized the negative infl uence their friends had upon them, pro-
moting “things I knew I shouldn’t be doing, [like] drugs, partying, fornicating.” But others said the negative 
infl uences came more from family than friends (as described in the “Home life” section of  this report), or 
from the community environment in general.
 “My mom thinks it’s all because of  my friends, but I got to thinking about it and I’ve been banging 
before any of  them [because of  siblings and cousins who were already in gangs]. We all came through 
in the same neighborhood, all had life experiences and here we are. I guess in a lot of  cases you do 
evolve around your environment.”  
This was a key problem according to stakeholders, who worried about the infi ltration of  “gang culture” into 
their cities, and particularly into poor neighborhoods. Stakeholders said that movies, television, video games, 
and the internet glorify money, drugs, violence, and sex. Some felt this image affected the ambitions and 
goals of  youth, and minimized the negative aspects of  a violent lifestyle. Since youth in poor neighborhoods 
may lack positive role models, these images may be particularly problematic.
Stakeholders also worried that youth in gang-fi lled neighborhoods put themselves in harm’s way by wearing 
gang clothing or imitating gang behavior; two stakeholders gave examples of  youth unaffi liated with gangs 
who were wrongly targeted by gangs due to their clothing and claims they made about gang-style exploits. 
Youth have made claims, real or imagined, on personal webpages that translate into street activity, with real 
gang members then targeting the youth for intimidation or recruitment. A few youth confi rmed this belief, 
including some of  the gang members who said the neighborhood youth had assumed them to be part of  
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a gang before they joined, mostly due to where they lived. They faced harassment from rival gangs even 
before joining a gang. 
Voids fi lled, for better or for worse. Gangs and friendships made on the streets seemed to fi ll voids in the 
lives of  these youth; they found the bonds and stability that was lacking in their families. Once youth joined 
a gang, they seemed to develop a strong sense of  loyalty to their fellow gang members. As one young man 
said, “I love my homeboys, you know? They’ve always had my back for anything. They are my accomplices, 
but also my homeboys.” Another said, “It ain’t about hurting people or nothing like that; I like the parties, I 
like my homeboys.”
Those not in gangs felt similar affi nity for their groups of  friends. In Washington, few youth spoke specifi -
cally of  gangs but rather their groups of  friends and homeys. For instance, one non-gang youth—who, 
like many of  these youth, described that he had trouble trusting others in general—said he loved both his 
parents, but that the only people in his life he trusted were his friends.
Public perception. Finally, in terms of  public perception, the appearance of  gang culture and actual gang 
activity can be synonymous. As one law enforcement representative said, “Adults can’t tell the difference be-
tween a kid emulating gang dress and behavior from a real gang member.” Another stakeholder said “In the 
eyes of  the public, all graffi ti is gang graffi ti.” Adults are left believing gangs are more prevalent than they 
are and, in turn, feel something needs to be done about it.
Limited options, limited perspectives…“This is what I know.” Some youth who did join a gang 
seemed to believe that joining was part of  growing up in their neighborhood, particularly if  their family and 
friends were already members. Not only did some youth feel they were assumed to be part of  a gang by 
other youth, but some felt their own family assumed they would join gangs. 
As one youth who offi cially joined in fi fth grade said, “Some join [the gang] for protection, I joined 
‘cause I was down, I grew up to do this.”
“I lost a couple [of  friends] to the grave. I lost a couple to the Pen, too…my friend who was in dia-
pers with me, he’s in [prison] doing 17 years.”
Some youth, especially those that had joined the gang at a very young age, seemed incapable of  imagining 
a world in which they would no longer be part of  the gang. As one youth in a gang said, “I’m not gonna 
change at least for right now, I’ve been doing this all my life you know?  I just don’t want new friends, you 
know what I’m saying?…and you know I like representing where I’m from, this is what I know.”  Another 
young man said, “That’s what I’ve dedicated and committed myself  do doing, to being in a gang, to being 
part of  a gang inside and outside of  freedom.” Still another youth said “I’m still always going to be with the 
gang...just for, to help the homies out, help the next generation coming up taking their fi rst steps” and also 
that he couldn’t think of  the negative consequences or activity of  the gang because “No, I was too deep into 
it, I just didn’t really care.” 
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One youth, contemplating being released after a two-year incarceration, reported he has begun to reassess 
some of  his past behavior. “Sometimes I think to myself  maybe it would be better if  I didn’t have a con-
science... Before I used to do things, you know what I’m saying; I used to be a gang member, gang banging, 
I used to do whatever I wanted, but I would never think about anything, about any of  the consequences of  
what I was really doing.”
School
School environment. The youth mostly described school environments that made it diffi cult for them to 
focus on their academics. The youth described schools that were dominated by rival groups of  students or 
gangs. Stakeholders confi rmed gangs were an issue in schools and among younger students than in previous 
generations. In San Mateo, the police department had instigated regular meetings with middle school admin-
istrators regarding gangs and crime in general. One youth commented that most of  the fi ghts were between 
Whites and African Americans, and that he and other Black youth in his school felt victimized by the sys-
tem.
No time for education. The majority of  youth had very high levels of  truancy. Most had gotten into fi ghts 
at school. Several had been expelled, stopped going to school altogether, or had been held back. The high 
rates of  truancy and suspensions negatively affected academic performance; one young man reported miss-
ing many tests due to his suspensions. One youth claimed he had been suspended 100 days in a single school 
year.
Diffi culties with studies. The young people interviewed had signifi cant diffi culties succeeding academi-
cally. Few discussed learning diffi culties per se: four mentioned trouble reading and three trouble with math. 
More often, youth mentioned they never did homework, but not necessarily because it was hard. They were 
doing other things. Several said they had been better students in elementary school, but by middle school 
were distracted and getting into trouble.
A few kept up academically despite getting into trouble in and away from school. One youth said his grades 
were fi ne, even though he had been in four schools in two years because of  his family moves and an expul-
sion.
Summary. Perhaps like most adolescents, the young people interviewed stressed the social rather 
than academic aspects of school. They described school environments that lacked the necessary 
structure and stability to help them succeed academically. The youth interviewed reported high 
levels of truancy and suspensions; some had been expelled. 
The majority of the stakeholders were very concerned with the school’s ability to positively inter-
vene in the lives of young people. In particular they were concerned with truancy and dropouts, 
though reentry after expulsions or time spent in juvenile facilities was also a major concern. Both 
youth and stakeholders thought schools too often involved the police in problems on campus and 
in truancy issues. (Note that teachers or school administrators were not among the stakeholders 
interviewed.)
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“That’s where I got my fame.” Several young people stated that they enjoyed school, but they had trouble 
succeeding academically given their social ties. 
Youth that liked school often discussed their friends and their popularity; “That’s where I got my fame…It 
was fun” one young man said about his middle school experience. He said he had been a good student 
throughout elementary school, but once he entered middle school and joined his brother’s circle of  friends, 
he became a chronic truant, was involved in many fi ghts, and was suspended numerous times.
“I’m getting my GED right now, because when I get out if  I’m eligible to go back to high school I 
don’t want to go. High school is nothing but drama and I’m the kind of  person, when I’m at school 
and I see another gang member, I’m a dumbass, I’m a hothead, I’m gonna get in a fi ght and I don’t 
want to do that.”
Not fi tting in. Some of  the young people’s complaints about school focused on the treatment they received 
from the other students. These youth were often ridiculed or bullied. Three youth said they were made fun 
of  because of  the clothing they wore. One female dropped out because her unpopularity made her unhappy. 
She said, “I was really made fun of  in middle school, nobody really liked me. I had no friends and, I don’t 
know why I didn’t do anything, I was just a scapegoat. Everybody just found something to make fun of…I 
just dropped out, I couldn’t take it any more.” 
Over-reliance on police
Some of  the youth felt that schools were overly reliant on suspensions and law enforcement. They sug-
gested that schools criminalized schoolyard fi ghts. Several of  the young people interviewed fi rst became 
involved in the juvenile justice system through their behavior at school, predominantly due to fi ghts. 
“They will give you assault charges and battery charges for a little fi ght and I’m like man it was a mu-
tual fi ght and they are like take it to trial.”  
Stakeholders agreed with youth, feeling strongly that the schools tried to rid themselves of  diffi cult children, 
through over-reliance on suspensions and expulsions, by keeping reentry children out of  their schools, and 
by referring youth to law enforcement for truancy. As one stakeholder said, the “School system isn’t as help-
ful as it could be because many schools are quick to banish kids.” Another stakeholder stressed the school 
system treated probation as a “dumping ground” for truant children. Indeed, a couple of  stakeholders said 
they hired advocates to work with youth to ensure that they could re-enroll in school. 
Savvy kids. Some of  the youth shared the techniques they used to hide their truancy from their par-
ents. They provided their school with wrong numbers or disconnected their phones when they knew 
the school would call. One youth said that if  police ever asked why he was not in school during school 
hours, he would tell them he had been suspended. 
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Teachers
A few of  the young people did not feel that they had support at school and one young woman said school 
staff  thought she was a “bad person.” Another youth, who had been suspended three times for fi ghting, said 
he felt he got along with his teachers, but that when he tried to talk to them about things they were never 
helpful. Another mentioned she never got special help or understanding from school staff; she eventually 
dropped out of  school after getting in fi ghts that she didn’t think were all her fault.
However, several youth mentioned hard-working supportive teachers. Several youth spoke of  specifi c teach-
ers or teaching styles—usually one-on-one—that they liked. One young male said that his teachers worked 
hard to support him, and he felt disappointed that he had let them down; he said, “Man, these people care 
about me and I’m just making myself  look bad, not holding my side of  the bargain.”
A few stakeholders questioned the quality of  the teaching, but stakeholders recognized that schools had 
limited resources and that a couple of  diffi cult students could make it very diffi cult to teach a crowded 
classroom. One stakeholder stressed that schools needed to focus on early education as it was hard to pro-
mote school attachment when children had faced failure at school since early childhood. However, some 
stakeholders recognized that schools had signifi cant resource and political constraints. In DC in particular, 
stakeholders suggested the school system feared it would be taken over by the federal government. 
Juvenile justice system
Early system contact, lost opportunities
Several of  the young people described prior contact with the police that had not led to placement or formal 
probation; as they did not receive resources or punishment, they seemed unaffected by such contact. 
Summary. Some of the youth reported that time in confi nement allowed them to think about their 
lives and past actions, and expressed a desire to change. However, this desire did not necessarily 
translate into concrete plans for a positive future. Most youth interviewed felt—and stakeholders 
generally agreed—that during their confi nement they were not making positive progress towards 
creating a better life for themselves. They felt removed from their social, family, and economic 
obligations back in their community. Further, they felt some of their experiences, including failure to 
complete probation, made it diffi cult to turn things around. The youth mentioned very few resourc-
es that had been helpful to them. 
Although they had concerns, stakeholders generally commended the efforts of law enforcement 
and juvenile justice agencies to address the needs of youth. Stakeholders discussed innovative 
youth programming within the police department, probation, detention, and the increased resourc-
es available to youth once in the system. However, some stakeholders questioned whether the ju-
venile justice system was right for delivering services, given its main function as law enforcement. 
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The stakeholders agreed with this assessment. They felt that by the time a child has made contact with law 
enforcement or with the juvenile justice system, it is likely that many chances for prevention have been 
missed. One stakeholder said, “The system shows interest in kids when they’re a burden but doesn’t en-
gage them before it gets to that point.” Stakeholders felt it was much more diffi cult to work to rehabilitate 
a youth that was already severely behind in school and had experienced trauma in his life, than to work to 
prevent these occurrences. Unfortunately, it was only possible to provide needed resources to children once 
they became part of  the juvenile justice system.
Arrested for Being Young
 As reported earlier, some youth and stakeholders alike felt that youth were being arrested and entering the 
juvenile justice system for youthful behaviors that would not have been criminalized before, such as neigh-
borhood and school fi ghts among children, and running away from home. Stakeholders suggested parents, 
community members, and schools were overwhelmed by youth behavior in their communities, and turned to 
law enforcement. 
Benefi ts of placement: programming and services
While some certainly felt they had benefi ted from services offered while in custody, others did not. Some 
youth reported the services seemed inconsistent or not benefi cial. 
Several youth did not feel they had a feasible or helpful re-entry plan set up for after their release. A few also 
described specifi c programming, such as camps that emphasized manual work, as irrelevant and unhelpful to 
their lives. Several youth suggested that educational opportunities were severely limited; they reported that 
the limited classes available did not prepare them to return to school.  
Success is diffi cult and not always purely a function of  the quality of  individual programs. One youth said 
she had been entered into a drug treatment program after failing drug tests; however, she kept running away 
from home during the program, which she felt was of  no benefi t to her.
Stakeholders described a range of  programs within law enforcement and the juvenile justice system that 
tried to address some of  the issues youth had experienced throughout their lives. Probation in each city 
provided mental health and substance abuse counseling, as well as confl ict resolution, yoga, and anger man-
agement classes. Whether a youth was in detention or out on probation, these programs, especially in San 
Mateo, often involved community-based providers, allowing the youth to maintain a connection with the 
community and facilitating continuity of  care after release.
Stakeholders also spoke of  creative ways they had tried to reach youth. A judge assigned biographical essays 
of  the victim to two youth who had been found responsible for her drug overdose. Stakeholders in Wash-
ington also described trips planned by DYRS and Court Social Services to other cities, such as New Orleans 
and New York, to expose youth to new environments and help youth recognize that there are opportunities 
and life options beyond those they see in their communities. Several Dallas stakeholders noted the Success-
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ful Thinking and Responsible Sexuality (STARS) program as a promising comprehensive youth treatment 
and supervision program for sex offenders.
Without offering any opinion of  the effectiveness of  the services she received, another youth said she was 
being treated for an emotional disorder with medication and counseling, and that she attended anger man-
agement sessions. She added, “I get mad when I get sad.” 
Some youth mentioned positive effects of  their involvement with the justice system. They suggested that 
some resources within the justice system had been helpful. A few of  the young people found it helpful to 
meet with former offenders; as one young man said, “He’s the only guy that I’ve ever been able to open my-
self  up to….what’s really going on, and what I’m really doing, I have a lot of  respect for that guy, I dunno 
this guy is like he knew me, he never lied to me.” A preteen girl adjudicated for a domestic violence incident 
said her team management program was helping with her family issues; she had brought her family out to 
dinner as part of  the program.
Many mentioned that their time in confi nement had allowed them time to refl ect on their actions and on 
their life trajectories. They refl ected on the impact their behavior was having on their family, on their lifestyle 
choices, and on their future plans. They looked back at what actions led them into trouble and questioned 
whether the actions were worth the consequences.
Youth in Washington gave Juvenile Services credit for reentry plans. Several of  the youth there said they felt 
their chances to do well were better because they were being enrolled into a school before leaving and had 
jobs lined up. Still, a couple of  these youth said that they felt too much was required of  them after release. 
Probation compliance
Some of  the youth felt that their attempts at improving their behavior were thwarted by overly harsh proba-
tion requirements and practices. Some original probation dates of  six months had expanded to three years 
due to continual violations. While youth might be willing to take steps towards improving their life chances, 
they had a diffi cult time, for instance, ending relationships with their best friends or quickly stopping their 
drug use. Several youth gave statements such as, “It seems like on probation everything’s a violation,” or 
“Once you go on probation they are on you for every little thing.” In particular, youth struggled with cur-
fews, drug testing, clothing restrictions, and limitations on the individuals with whom they could spend their 
free time. “Some people can’t stop just [taking drugs] all of   a sudden, like they used to pee test me three 
times a week, some people can’t get out of  it that fast. It’s hard! It’s hard to get off  probation.”
Also, several of  the young people thought their probation offi cers were more concerned with them comply-
ing with their probation terms than their well being. Some youth implied that probation might go differently 
if  they had more of  a personal connection with their probation offi cer; as one stakeholder said, they are 
“Just policing, not really caring! They don’t ask ‘how are you?’” 
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The youth recognized the need for most of  the probation-related restrictions, acknowledging, for instance, 
that drug use kept them from success in other parts of  their lives and that hanging out with their old friends, 
especially on the streets at night, was a bad idea; one said, “Trouble happens late night on the street.” Yet the 
youth felt the parameters were too strict too soon and that they did not allow for the many factors that kept 
youth from fulfi lling them. The youth felt they had few alternatives to their old ways and would continue to 
have trouble completing probation.
Self-perspective of youth
There were various indications that youth had realistic and rather astute perspectives on their own lives. It 
was not the impression of  the interviewers that these youth were just saying what they understood adults 
wanted to hear or reiterating words they had heard adults use to describe them, whether in sympathy or 
judgment. Like any group of  youths, some had a fl are for the dramatic, some were inclined to self-aggran-
dize, and some were reserved and a bit sullen. But the youth seemed to be speaking honestly and offering 
their own assessments of  their circumstances.
Several young people recognized the environmental factors that affected their past behavior, but still 
stressed their personal responsibility. “I made my own decisions and I don’t blame nobody but myself. I 
can’t blame no one for my actions. I have to be responsible for my actions.”
Others were keenly aware of  contradictions in their lives. One, for instance, contrasted his street life with 
more traditional lifestyles, and said he tried his best to “leave school for school” knowing that he could not 
succeed academically otherwise. Stakeholders agreed that some youth walk in two worlds. One spoke of  a 
youth in placement for a violent offense and drug use who had letters sent to the court on his behalf  saying 
he was a good student and conscientious employee. 
“The lucky ones”?
For every risk factor for system-involvement and delinquency described by these youth—broken homes, 
violent victimization, drug abuse, gangbanging, school problems—they also described strengths and protec-
tive factors—loving, present parents and stable home life, no victimization or drug use, never joined a gang, 
did well in school. Yet still they had still ended up in juvenile placement. More common were youth with 
many risk factors. For instance, one young woman had joined a gang, but did no illicit drugs herself. Both 
her parents were incarcerated, and the grandmother with whom she lived was a crack cocaine user. The 
young woman was in placement for a domestic assault.
“I might be one of  the lucky ones that have their little things on the street, but when it comes to 
school I have success there too. I don’t really try to get my street life mixed up with my school life 
because I do like to get educated.”
Perhaps revealing a professional’s perspective on root causes of  crime, several youth made efforts to dissoci-
ate themselves from the perception that their families, or their personal psychology, had caused their delin-
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quency. When asked generally about growing up, one youth quickly pointed out his parents were good to 
him, “didn’t abuse me or each other,” and that they had always lived in a safe neighborhood. 
Further, despite similar backgrounds and situations, not all these youth were motivated by the same internal 
or external factors. Some seemed more motivated by social concerns and made decisions to better their im-
age among their peers, with drug sales or the gang life. This type of  youth might have thought that selling 
drugs would increase his buying power and ability to control his image.” Others seemed motivated by more 
personal or internal confl icts, often related to their home life. Some admitted that they were mainly follow-
ers and that their peers or older people around them led them into trouble. They did not consider the bigger 
picture. And for a few, their troubles were exacerbated by events such as the loss of  someone important 
through death or imprisonment.
Among the youth perhaps one or two were seriously hardened cases. One judge described these youth as 
likely lost causes, with a look in their eye and an attitude that said “they just don’t care.” She said in all her 
various jobs in the system, those were about 2% or fewer of  the youth she saw. As an example, she de-
scribed a youth who had “committed a very bad crime; had been abused, burned, sexually abused; mom 
is a junkie; never fi nished school in the same one he started the year in; through fi ve different foster care 
settings. When that kid looks at you with those ‘dead eyes’ you know the ability to build the core of  empa-
thy that the kid needs to not commit future crimes is not there, the raw material is not there; that kid is a 
sociopath, one of  the 2%.” Two other stakeholders mentioned kids that lacked conscience and who never 
responded to rehabilitation efforts. Youth who joined gangs very early were sometimes this type. The judge 
stressed, however, that they were the exceptions, that most kids can change, and she spoke of  how gratify-
ing it was to see previous wards on the street doing well, years free of  the system. She estimated 85% of  the 
youth in her courtroom are one-timers.
The Future
“What am I doing with myself ? Where am I going? What am I going to be doing when I am 25?”
The young people interviewed expressed an interest in avoiding future involvement in the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems. Various among them felt that if  they did not change their behavior they would end 
up incarcerated or dead. Several young people expressed concern that they would not be able to clear their 
record by the time they were 18 and would have to face the consequences of  their actions then; “I’m not 
even 18 yet. I don’t want to start on the wrong foot.” Those already or planning to be parents were con-
cerned they were not and would not be there for their children. They wanted to make their families proud, 
break the intergenerational cycle of  system involvement, and not be locked away as their own children grew. 
Some felt that being inside would make it very diffi cult to catch up in school and that they would lose their 
jobs permanently.
Some of  the young people discussed returning to school or completing their GED while confi ned; they 
thought these academic accomplishments would help them better succeed upon their release, although 
some were concerned a degree from a high school within a correctional institution would in some way mark 
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them and not be as useful as a degree from a regular high school. Others mentioned counselors that helped 
them explain their absence to employers or schools, or plan for their future. A few mentioned future ambi-
tions; they wanted to graduate high school, obtain a well-paying construction job, own a barbershop, start 
a daycare center, work as a medical assistant, or get a college scholarship playing football. Some of  these 
youth had demonstrated their capacity for hard work by obtaining their GED, securing post-release housing, 
ending long-term drug addictions, and behaving well while incarcerated. While one youth was incarcerated 
she was able to obtain her GED, secure affordable transitional housing for her release upon turning 18 years 
old, and look into grants for a technical certifi cation.
Unfortunately, it was more often the case that the youth tended to sound vague when discussing their future, 
unclear of  how to make or achieve goals. Although a few had taken concrete steps to pursue particular 
professions or occupations, many seemed unaware of  the possibilities. Several youth said they really didn’t 
know, even in broad terms, what their interests were and couldn’t tell the interviewer anything that they con-
sidered themselves “good at.” These youth, in turn, had no specifi c plans for the future.
Most youth were likely to face a diffi cult time upon release. The majority had already been released from 
secure facilities and had been unable to remain away. Instead of  emphasizing their plans for the future, most 
of  the youth discussed feeling left out of  their lives. They were missing out on their family, friends, school, 
and jobs.
 “A release date, it feels so good; a release date, at the same time, I’m about to get out… what am I 
gonna go do? It’s hard, people tell me ‘You get out and you are going to go back to the same thing 
and you are gonna come right back,’ and I’m like ‘Yeah, but what else is there to do?’ All this time, 
the only thing I’m thinking about is reminiscing on old memories. [But] the old memories I had are 
all negative; I don’t have anything positive lined up for me.” 
Another youth seemed content to be in secure placement for the time being. She was a gang member; she 
had an emotional disorder; she reported that she had been abused at home; she said her father had been ar-
rested for drug use and sexual assault (she did not imply the assault involved her). She said, simply, “I don’t 
mind being in Juvi. Better to be here and be safe.” 
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The role of the juvenile justice system
Police as social workers and juvenile justice as catch-all
Stakeholders elaborated on the issue of  an over-reliance on the police. They agreed with the youth that law 
enforcement offi cers were often called to address minor issues, such as fi ghts, pranks and mischief, and 
rebelliousness. The emphasis on community policing meant the police’s role had “evolved into quasi-social 
worker.” Stakeholders described how youth became involved in the juvenile system for behavior that was 
not always considered a crime. Law enforcement offi cers did not have the proper training to address the 
needs of  youth. They are trained to react to situations and to arrest individuals. According to one stakehold-
er, the result of  involving the police was to “…criminalize basic teen behavior. Once you start that process 
of  locking kids up for being kids, where does that stop?” She suggested that police needed to be trained in 
dealing with youth effectively through understanding their development. 
Other stakeholders felt that staff  have been trained to address the development and social needs of  youth in 
such departments as San Mateo’s Youth Services Center and, in Washington, the Oak Hill and Youth Ser-
vices Center and the Court Social Services drop-in center. 
Several stakeholders expressed concern that enforcement agencies might control too much of  needed 
resources. They stressed that an awareness of  the root causes of  crime by probation, police, and juvenile 
justice is not equal to increased investment in the communities and families affected by violence. A few 
stakeholders suggested the cities were not as willing to fund community-based organizations as they were to 
fund probation or police departments to address the issues faced by youth. 
Serving more youth or net widening?
Some expressed concern that enforcement agencies were not the best suited to address the needs of  the 
youth and that those agencies’ efforts could lead to an increase in the number of  youth involved in the juve-
nile justice system. They felt the needs of  at-risk youth certainly should be addressed, but that the juvenile 
justice system was not the system to do it.
According to stakeholders, deeper system involvement may follow an initial police contact for reasons apart 
from the seriousness of  the offense. In impoverished communities and families, stakeholders worried that 
Summary. As would be expected, stakeholders generally had a broader perspective than youth re-
garding the successes or failures of the juvenile justice system and its appropriate role in the lives 
of youth. Although stakeholders mainly agreed on what got youth into the system, they disagreed 
on what should be done and the appropriate role of law enforcement and the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Though they commend attempts by law enforcement and juvenile justice agencies to address 
the needs of youth, some stakeholders expressed reservations, saying that other city agencies 
should be handling much of that work, preferably earlier in the youths’ lives.
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the only way to provide resources is to keep children under the jurisdiction of  the court or in a committed 
facility. A couple of  prosecutors stressed that they engaged in civil proceedings simply to ensure that youth 
with serious mental health issues that had engaged in criminal behavior could receive needed mental health 
services. A Dallas stakeholder suggested that “We over-detain, over-commit to get kids services; if  kids 
could get access to services they could be stabilized out of  the system.” Because youth need to learn to live 
in a positive manner in their communities, some stakeholders suggested that community-based resources 
would be more appropriate in many cases. 
Including at-risk youth. Resources for youth outside the juvenile justice system are limited. To remedy this 
situation, San Mateo’s Youth Services Center’s assessment center provides resources for youth not involved 
in the system. Stakeholders said that Center staff  worked to assess all the factors—history, family, mental 
health issues, substance abuse, etc.— of  at-risk youth then decide what to do, emphasizing community-
based services though residential placement as an option. The Center accepts self-referrals or referrals by 
parents, school personnel, or other concerned adults and is staffed with representatives from probation, 
mental health, and social workers. Center workers conduct comprehensive assessments and create individu-
alized plans for the referred youth.
One-stop services. To provide continuity of  services and reduce the likelihood that youth “fall through the 
cracks” between levels of  the system, the San Mateo probation department supervises all the youth services: 
the detention programs, the placement programs, the non-placement programming (e.g., family preserva-
tion, intensive supervision, wraparound programming, camps, drug court, intensive drug court, mentoring 
for young gang members by former gang members) and the post-placement follow-ups. Often the same 
probation offi cers will stay with a youth through all the steps of  the system. This continuity was certainly 
considered benefi cial to the youth, except for those stakeholders who felt the juvenile justice system was 
simply not the right venue for these services.
Misdirected resources?
Regarding the success of  current approaches, the youth seemed to confi rm that the services they received 
and even the supervision style of  the professionals responsible for them often fell short. Youth described a 
small number of  programs or services in positive terms. They reported diffi culties in completing probation 
and in connecting with their probation offi cers, and they had a general sense that their lives were not mov-
ing forward while in placement.
Steps taken: reduced reliance on detention, increased community-based efforts
Stakeholders in all three cities described their efforts to reduce the number of  youth in their secure facilities 
and to instead provide more resources in the community. These cities are using risk assessments to assess 
whether youth need to be detained because of  public safety concerns. If  they are not a threat to public 
safety but have pressing social needs, these can be addressed in a non-secure environment. DYRS stakehold-
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ers asserted that they have considerably reduced the population inside their commitment facility (Oak Hill), 
and have plans to replace it with a smaller facility. 
Stakeholders in Washington and Dallas credit the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), which 
has been implemented in both cities, with drawing attention to the over-reliance of  detention in the juvenile 
justice system. Stakeholders asserted that JDAI, a project of  the Annie E. Casey Foundation, helped bring 
stakeholders together to look at data related to the detention of  youth. Often, reliable data had been missing 
from these conversations; JDAI creates a shared set of  information to help shed light on issues such as the 
detention of  low-risk children. One stakeholder claimed that this initiative changed the way she responded 
to kids in her court room; now she tries to look for alternatives to detention and to see what services she 
can provide to stabilize children outside of  confi nement. JDAI was mentioned as providing various im-
provements to the systems in Washington and Dallas, including helping to channel money to where it is 
most needed. Dallas stakeholders also reported changes to the way probation offi cers approach work, 
including more specialized case loads, working with youth where they live, and training in handling diffi cult 
youth.
A few stakeholders expressed concern that reforms were too focused on detention and felt that other parts 
of  the system deserved attention. Nevertheless, the majority of  stakeholders credited JDAI with getting 
people to think about detention differently and to work to reduce it in both cities. 
Tough enough?
Some stakeholders worried that by changing the role of  law enforcement under the guise of  addressing the 
development and social needs of  youth, some enforcement agencies, particularly DYRS’ Oak Hill and San 
Mateo’s Youth Service Center, were not holding youth accountable for their actions. These stakeholders 
stressed that some youth thought it was a status symbol to be placed in a secure facility. If  their stays were 
short and fairly pleasant, they would have less of  an incentive to avoid them. A couple of  stakeholders sug-
gested that new policies in Washington were leading to increased recidivism. Contradicting that argument, 
another stakeholder, a juvenile court judge in fi rm support of  alternatives to detention, said a short deten-
tion was sometimes a useful tool to show minor offenders that their freedoms could be taken away from 
them if  they continued their risky behavior. 
Community engagement and education
There were many ways stakeholders were reaching out to their communities to correct misperception, ex-
plain the purpose and tactics of  the juvenile justice system, get community support for those activities, and 
help parents and community members address youth issues. Several of  these efforts were described in earlier 
sections of  this report. Probation offi cers said they conducted parenting classes and taught parents about 
youth behavior that may be indicative of  gang involvement. They hoped to help parents instill order in their 
household. Law enforcement and probation offi cers also spoke to community groups about the benefi ts 
of  various alternatives to incarceration, such as fi rst offenders diverted to early prevention programs. A key 
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message, they say, is assuring the public that police will still enforce the law, still protect the community. The 
public response to these efforts seemed to be very positive.
Noting changing demographics of  San Mateo (which was less of  an issue in Dallas and Washington), the 
police and probation made special efforts to reach out to individual communities within San Mateo and ap-
plied cultural competency standards to all of  their activities.
In San Mateo, police and probation worked with the Tongan Interfaith Council to address violence in the 
community. By targeting community leaders and focusing on providing information in a culturally appropri-
ate manner, the San Mateo police were able to reach parents and families that before remained distant from 
city and county agencies. Through the Police Activities League, police offi cers in San Mateo work as coach-
es, teachers, and mentors to youth in the community.
Summary of Findings 
It is usual for crime rates to fl uctuate; however, newspaper reports as a whole emphasize—and often exag-
gerate—rises in crime, while drops in crimes are minimized. When overall crime rates are static or dropping, 
the media look for change in individual types of  crime. Increases in crime do not warrant the exaggerated 
coverage typically found in newspaper reports, which are typically focused on particularly shocking crimes 
and seldom provide a complete picture of  the many factors affecting rates of  crime. Further, crime in gen-
eral is often attributed to youth when, in fact, adults commit the vast majority of  all types of  crime. Positive 
stories about youth, as opposed to those emphasizing trouble and violence, are hard to fi nd, leaving the 
public with a distorted view of  youth and their role in crime.
Interviewed stakeholders did not necessarily share the same political views on delinquent youth: some 
preferred greater emphasis on law enforcement, accountability, and public safety, while others preferred to 
emphasize programming, community-based efforts, and prevention. However, regardless of  these views, 
in doing their work stakeholders considered the full range of  factors that infl uence youth behavior, little of  
which can be found in newspaper coverage of  youth or crime. While elected offi cials may feel the need to 
respond to crime as reported in the media, or may use such coverage as leverage for pushing through their 
preferred programs, stakeholders recognize the cyclical nature of  crime and the need to focus on long-term 
strategies rather than short-term changes. Stakeholders felt that some policies that focused on short-term 
crime trends or particularly heinous crimes used resources that would be better spent on more longsighted 
methods and that shortsighted policies may, in fact, make the situation worse.
Ask the youth! Perhaps the most interesting fi ndings stem from what NCCD learned in the youth inter-
views. The stories they told were common to other youth involved in the justice system: unsettled house-
holds, violent communities, the inexorable draw of  drugs, gangs and delinquent behavior, inconsequential 
early system contacts, and gradually deeper movement into the system. 
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Put together, the stories serve as an outline of  the root causes of  crime and a blueprint for early interven-
tion and prevention programs. In effect, they are an evaluation of  how the adults in their lives and society at 
large had met their responsibilities to young people (we did not fare very well). They suggest how to do bet-
ter, if  not for them, then for their young siblings and the next generation. The youth told their stories with 
insight and, notably, without passing the sort of  judgment that others had passed on them throughout their 
lives. Most of  these youth had a clear idea of  why things turned out the way they had for them. Most took 
personal responsibility for their plight; while acknowledging the failures of  the adults responsible for their 
care, few blamed anyone in particular but themselves. Furthermore, the youths’ assessment of  their own 
situation agreed in almost every respect with how the stakeholders—experts in the fi eld—assessed the same 
thing. The youth were, in short, experts on themselves. And they added a personal element that illuminates 
how society can better serve them, and others like them, to avoid system contact.
Although these youth were among the most serious offenders in the system, they were not the heartless 
monsters described in many news reports. Interviewers found the youth to be funny, engaging, and thought-
ful; even those not particularly engaged in the interview treated the interviewers with courtesy and respect. 
Their motivations for high-risk and delinquent behavior were complicated, but often involved common ado-
lescent needs for interpersonal connections and a sense of  belonging and self, and perhaps seeking a little 
order among the chaos that characterized their lives at home and in their neighborhoods. 
In short, trends in crime do not indicate tougher responses to youth crime—these youth are not superpreda-
tors—but system reform, nevertheless, is necessary, and demands a comprehensive, long-term approach 
based on the perspective of  the youth, families, and community.
What the public should know about crime, about the system, and about youth.
This fi nal section very briefl y catalogs various observations made by youth and professional stakeholders, as 
well as NCCD insights gleaned mostly through the youth interviews. The observations may inform efforts 
to improve media coverage and public perception of  youth, crime, and the justice system and to improve 
the system itself. 
Educate the media. Justice agencies need to make special and ongoing efforts to provide both interesting 
and factual information to news agencies.
Educate the public directly. Public perception impacts the system and those involved in it at almost every 
level, from funding for new programs to crime-focused legislation and propositions, to understanding the 
benefi ts and detriments to system involvement for youth, to improved intergenerational communication and 
relations in the community. This can include involving the public in justice system events and programs and 
linking justice facilities with community volunteers and community-based services. Cultural sensitivity is es-
sential to forming productive relationships among agencies, community groups, and individuals.
Promote healthy families and effective parenting. Frustrated and bewildered parents that engage police 
and probation offi cers as a parenting tool can be aided through early intervention and community-based 
parenting programs.
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Establish access to better and quicker data sources to assist both law enforcement and the media.
Broaden training for police and probation offi cers. As police and probation offi cers take on broader 
roles, appropriate training and institutional support is essential.
Remember that system-involved youth are youth. To better understand and engage system-involved 
youth, the fi rst step is to understand their development. Those convicted of  serious crime are not so unlike 
average youth. They are observant, they have a sense of  themselves, they are proud, yet they are often im-
mature.
They need help contemplating the consequences of  their actions beyond punishment and loss of  freedom. 
The youth themselves felt that their early contact with adults—teachers, police, or others—had the potential 
to make a difference in their lives.
They have complicated lives and motivations. Chaotic home lives and early exposure to risky behavior are 
not things most adults can relate to. Their homes may be less than ideal, but they are all they know.
Youth need help seeing the big picture, the purpose of  services. For example, they need help developing 
reentry plans and understanding why they them. They need help seeing past their release date and reunion 
with their troubled homes and communities.
They are not superpredators, they are not lost causes, but rather have made mistakes. They may be in dan-
gerous ruts, but they maintain hope for new directions.
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